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 A B S T R A C T 
___ 
 
The majority of scholarship surrounding the late 2000s financial crisis 
explores the enabling factors that contributed to the subprime bubble and caused 
it to burst.  This study’s purpose is to evaluate systemic risk and the near collapse 
of the financial sector in 2008.  Several factors, including derivatives innovation, 
the rise of a parallel banking industry, and the securitization boom, heightened 
systemic fragility.  I add to financial contagion literature by constructing a 
stochastic game theory model of institutional decision-making under the auspices 
of a severe liquidity shortage.  Moreover, I will employ this model to evaluate the 
government’s regulatory program during the crisis.  I find that the government’s 
ad hoc interventions and non-interventions significantly contributed to the 
atmosphere of uncertainty and exacerbated the crisis’ ill effects.  I go on to 
evaluate the Dodd-Frank Act in light of those conclusions and suggest an 
alternate method of financial reform.   
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1.1 
 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
___ 
 
 
 The notion of risk has taken on new meaning for many in light of the 
recent—and some would argue ongoing—financial crisis.  The crisis and ensuing 
recession has led some pundits to question the societal value of Wall Street and 
the moral constitution of bankers.  However, the errors in judgment that allowed 
for this stunning meltdown to occur can be traced to two distinct developments 
within the finance industry over the past 30 years and the government’s inability 
to effectively regulate them.  Derivatives innovation and the rise of a parallel 
banking industry have linked the most significant financial institutions in a 
variety of ways.  I propose to conduct a study of the implications of increasingly 
correlated financial firms and the regulatory conditions in which they operate. 
Systemic risk theory attempts to quantify the risk that a shock to the 
financial system significantly deteriorates its crucial functions and threatens to 
destabilize the greater economy.  Over the past thirty years, radical innovation 
has transformed the finance industry and the government’s relationship with it.  
During this time, the emergence of derivatives markets and a shadow (or 
parallel) banking system has significantly altered the ability of managers and 
regulators to understand risk.  Though these apparatus have expanded the 
provision of liquidity and provided vehicles for risk management, derivatives and 
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shadow banking have also transformed conceptions of financial fragility.  My goal 
is to explore whether these developments have compromised the government’s 
ability to effectively regulate the financial industry.   
 By designating a workable definition of systemic risk, I hope to develop a 
model that better characterizes the realities of financial instability and reveals the 
shortcomings of government oversight and intervention.  Though there are many 
scholarly conceptions of this illusive notion, William C. Hunter and David 
Marshall, two Federal Reserve economists, have established a thorough 
framework that will provide the basis for my research.  They suggest that 
systemic risk must originate in the “process of financing;” that is, they assert that 
“systemic risk would not be present if all firms were purely financed internally.”1 
Moreover, a systemic crisis involves a severe degree of contagion, a sharp 
reduction of liquidity, implies considerable real economic consequences, and 
demands a policy response. By evaluating firms’ decisions through this analytical 
prism, I intend to decipher the events that lead to instances of systemic 
instability.   
Because the recent financial collapse has not been entirely resolved, I have 
an auspicious opportunity to evaluate different regulatory responses.  In 
particular, I endeavor to evaluate government action in the heat of the crisis as 
well as reform procedures in the United States Congress’ Dodd-Frank Act.  By 
examining the prospects for federal oversight and significant regulation in the 
                                                
1 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives, Systematic Risk and Central Banking: A Review of Recent Developments,” a Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper WP 99‐20. 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financial sector, I will evaluate these initiatives’ ability to diminish the impact of 
systemic risk.  I hope to produce an applicable, game theory stochastic model of 
financial contagion that will provide a context for firm and industry-wide 
decisions during a crisis.  This model will rely heavily on the work of Roger 
Lagunoff and Stacey Schreft (1998).  I will expand their simple investor-
entrepreneur model to explore significant financial institution’s financing 
processes and asset portfolios, as well as the role of government interventions on 
institutional decision-making.  
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1.2 
 
W H A T   I S   S Y S T E M I C   R I S K ? 
___ 
 
 
 
 The notion of systemic risk implies widespread breakdowns across an 
entire system.  Scholars typically present three courses of understanding in 
regard to systemic risk.  Frederic Mishkin, an economist and former Federal 
Reserve Board member, asserts that systemic risk is “the likelihood of a sudden, 
usually unexpected, event that disrupts information in financial markets, making 
them unable to effectively channel funds to those parties with the most 
productive investment opportunities.”2  This definition addresses the risk of a 
macro-level shock disrupting the viability of financial markets; in this case, 
systemic “refers to an event having effects on the entire banking, financial, or 
economic system, rather than just one or a few institutions.”3  It does not specify 
the depth of interaction or means of transmission between intermediaries, 
institutions, and other units.  
 A stricter definition, here provided by the 2001 G10 Report on 
Consolidation in the Financial Sector, allows that systemic risk is the “risk that an 
event will trigger a loss of economic value or confidence in a substantial portion 
of the financial system that is serious enough to quite probably have significant 
                                                
2 Frederic Mishkin, “Asymmetric Information and Financial Crises: A Historical Perspective.” In Financial Markets and Financial Crises, edited by R. Glenn Hubbard, 69–108. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1991. 
3 Philip Bartholomew and Gary Whalen, “Fundamentals of Systemic Risk,” in Research in Financial 
Services: Banking, Financial Markets, and Systemic Risk. (JAI: Greenwich, CT), 1995. 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adverse effects on the real economy.”4  This conception parallels that of the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS), which contends that systemic risk is “the risk 
that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn 
cause other participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader 
financial difficulties.”5  These definitions illustrate the domino chain-reaction 
effect of financial exposure; in this understanding, merely one institutional 
failure threatens to destabilize the system. In addition, these perceptions 
“emphasize correlation with causation, and they require close and direct 
connections among institutions or markets.”6 
 The third concept of systemic risk very closely resembles the second in 
regard to financial contagion, but allows for less direct institutional connections 
and more market uncertainty.  According to Kaufman and Scott, “when one unit 
experiences adverse effects from a shock—say the failure of a large financial or 
non financial firm—that generates severe losses, uncertainty is created about the 
values of other units potentially subject to adverse effects from the same shock.”7  
Perceived weaknesses—real or imagined—in institutions with exposure to the 
failure can result in abounding withdrawals. In the face of market uncertainty, 
investors and corporations will ‘run to quality’ from all units that appear 
potentially at risk.  At a certain point, “common-shock contagion appears 
indiscriminate, potentially affecting more or less the entire universe and 
                                                
4 Group of Ten. 2001. "The G10 Report on Consolidation in the Financial Sector." 
5 Bank for International Settlements, 64th Annual Report. Basel, Switzerland, 1994. 
6 George Kaufman and Kenneth Scott, “What is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard or Contribute to It?” in the Independent Review, 2003. 
7 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 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reflecting a general loss of confidence in all units.”8 This conception of systemic 
risk emphasizes the unavailability of information regarding risk exposures and 
credit lines. Known as reassessment or common shock, this scenario involves 
liquidity freezes and represents correlation with indirect causation (as opposed to 
direct “domino” causation in the second formulation).  
 
Part 1—A Workable Definition 
William C. Hunter and David Marshall present five general elements that 
should characterize a reasonable model of systemic risk.   First, they assert that 
systemic risk follows from the notion that not all firms are financed internally; 
that is, the “capital needed by a firm is provided by investors outside of the 
firm.”9  Thus, systemic risk originates in and is a characteristic of the financial 
markets.  Further, Hunter and Marshal suggest that systemic crises contain some 
sort of contagion, wherein problems in one institution threaten insolvency in 
other institutions (some of which may be otherwise healthy).  They also contend 
that systemic crises will involve a loss of investor confidence.  This often results 
in a liquidity shortage and credit crunch, as firms and individuals lose confidence 
in one another.  Hunter and Marshall’s framework also addresses the “substantial 
real costs” of systemic crises, which include “losses to economic output and/or 
reductions in economic efficiency.”10  Finally, they argue that systemic crises 
                                                
8 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 
9 George Kaufman and Robert R. Bliss (2006): “Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout” in Journal of Financial Stability 2 (2006). 
10 Kaufman and Bliss (2006). 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demand a policy response.  Addressing systemic crises can prove difficult (in this 
form or any) because they seem to arise spontaneously and with little warning.  
By employing this evaluative framework, I have selected what I deem to be the 
most relevant and explanatory delineation of systemic risk.   
 Darryll Hendricks, of the PEW Research Center’s Financial Reform 
Project, defines systemic risk as “the risk of a phase transition from one 
equilibrium to another, much less optimal equilibrium, characterized by multiple 
self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms making it difficult to reverse.”11  By 
considering other arenas where systemic stability is studied (epidemiology and 
evolutionary biology, for example), this scientific definition allows for theoretical 
analysis of the phenomenon and thus will be the definition used in this paper.  
Hendricks adds that individuals will respond similarly to systemic events: they 
will act rationally to save themselves but in doing so worsen the situation.  In this 
way, systemic events tend to be characterized by “contagion, hoarding, and 
flight.”12  In Wall Street vernacular, instances of systemic risk are characterized 
by extreme market volatility, severely diminished liquidity, sharp credit squeezes, 
and the threat of widespread insolvency.  
 Hendricks asserts that every financial crisis consists of some combination 
of three different elements: a bank run, a market failure, and an infrastructure 
collapse.  In a prototypical bank run, confidence in an institution erodes to the 
extent that depositors demand restitution of their deposits.  In order to meet 
                                                
11 Daryll Hendricks (2009): "Defining Systemic Risk." The Pew Financial Reform Project, 2009.  
12 Hendricks (2009): "Defining Systemic Risk." 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these obligations, a bank must sell off illiquid assets at significantly depressed 
prices.  When those assets hit markets at depressed values, the public views them 
as ‘toxic’ and immediately associates exposure to ‘toxic’ assets as a bellwether for 
an unhealthy balance sheet, which stigmatizes other banking institutions.  This 
self-aggrandizing process was especially evident following the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in 2008, when its creditors withdrew repo funding13 and it was unable 
finance day-to-day operations.  As Lehman went under, analysts and investors 
began to question the solvency of Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, simply 
because their exposure to seemingly toxic assets was deemed to be similar to 
Lehman’s14.  The bank run aspect of financial crises is an important aspect of 
systemic risk.  
 For a market failure to occur, the market must misprice an entire asset 
class.  As expectations come crashing down, that asset class dramatically loses 
value, which forces institutions to rapidly reduce their exposure and cover 
collateral margins.  The ensuing sell-off can drag other asset classes into the 
downward spiral of distressed values, which reinforces the effects of the initial 
bubble burst.  Excessive leverage and inadequate risk models inevitably 
contribute to the effects of a market collapse.15  While the housing market bubble 
was the chief agent of market failure in 2008, the mortgage backed security and 
                                                
13 A repo is a sale‐and‐repurchase agreement in which an institution sells the legal ownership of a security to a ‘creditor’ overnight so as to finance day‐to‐day operations and long positions. At term the borrowing institution repurchases the security, which basically equates the transaction to a cash loan.  
14 In this case, the analysts’ concerns were justified. 
15 Hendricks, "Defining Systemic Risk." 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collateralized debt obligation securitization and re-securitization process 
perilously exacerbated the effects of a market downturn.  By transferring 
immeasurable amounts of risk across the banking system, the web of mispriced 
MBS/CDO entanglement contributed to the ‘bank run’ contagion. 
 According to Hendricks, systemic risk also threatens the “integrity of 
market mechanisms.”16  A violent downturn could cause the market’s 
infrastructure to completely and utterly fail; under the stress of extremely high 
volume, clearance and settlement systems will cease to process trades—instantly 
suspending liquidity. During the “flash crash” on May 6, 2010, mutual fund 
manager Waddell & Reed’s models prompted a huge sell-off in futures contracts, 
which caused the stock market to drop 600 points instantaneously.  As a result, 
algorithms at high-volume shops around the world went berserk and executed 
millions of trades within milliseconds of the drop.  At brokerages in financial 
centers, extraordinary volume threatened to overwhelm the capacity of clearance 
and settlement systems.  Without these back-end processors, brokers would be 
unable to handle client trading and markets would cease to function for practical 
purposes.  If highly buttressed brokerage systems were to fail, it is reasonable to 
assume that exchange mechanisms would also wilt under the strain of 
unprecedented volume.  This scenario would be akin to an infrastructure failure—
both exchange (like the NYSE, CME, and LIFFE) and OTC trading17 would 
collapse.   
                                                
16 Hendricks, "Defining Systemic Risk.”  
17 OTC—or ‘over the counter’—trading of financial instruments occurs directly between two counterparties.  There is no exchange mechanism for the purpose of facilitating trades. 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  Scholars often make a distinction between rational, information-based, 
and causal systemic risk and non information-based, irrational, and purely 
contagious systemic risk.18  The former allows that investors, depositors, and 
market participants have the ability to differentiate between healthy and toxic 
entities on the basis of fundamental information.  Irrational contagion, on the 
other hand, “does not differentiate among parties, affecting solvent as well as 
insolvent parties, and is likely to be both broader and more difficult to contain.”19 
However, “the danger that a failure of one financial business may infect other 
otherwise healthy businesses,”20 is not unique to one conception of systemic risk 
or another.  The distinction between direct, rational contagion and common-
shock irrational contagion is at best fuzzy, as rational contagion often begets 
irrational systemic risk. Thus, systemic risk is an ambiguous and abstract notion, 
which makes it difficult to concretely define.  The three conditions of systemic 
instability, the three formulations of systemic risk, and the degrees of rationality 
in a crisis should be considered as adaptable delineations.  Not every crisis or 
collapse will conform rigidly to one set of characteristics and most cases of 
instability will be some combination of the factors explored.  
 
 
 
                                                
18 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 
19 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 
20 E.A.J. George (1998): “The New Lady of Threadneedle Street” in Governor’s Speech, Bank of England. London, February 24, 1998. 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Part 2—Sources of Systemic Risk 
 Prior to many systemic crises, financial markets and macroeconomic 
variables seem normal.  It is exceptionally important to develop a framework that 
recognizes “financial fragility.”21  According to Hunter and Marshall, there are 
five distinct sources of systemic risk (and consequential financial instability). I 
endeavor to explore these sources and their relationship to a functional model of 
systemic risk.  Such a model should account for the possibility that a “small shock 
can induce widespread difficulties in obtaining financing (especially short-term 
liquidity), resulting in a large decline in [optimum] economic activity.”22  
 For many economists, excessive leverage is the chief symptom of systemic 
risk.  In Charles Kindleberger’s book Manias, Panics, and Crashes, he attributes 
cases of financial instability to the “excessive piling on of debt”.23  Due to intense 
industry competition and governmental regulation, financial firms increasingly 
finance capital activities with debt liabilities.  When an entire industry operates 
under the auspices of extreme leverage, an idiosyncratic event “can induce 
multiple simultaneous corporate defaults.”24  By risking more in order to achieve 
higher returns, firms inherently deviate from the principle of shareholder value 
maximization.  Some critical pundits cite exorbitant compensation packages as 
the impetus for such imprudent risks.  Though compensation packages that 
                                                
21 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives, Systematic Risk and Central Banking: A Review of Recent Developments,” a Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working Paper WP 99‐20. 
22 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 
23 Charles P. Kindleberger (1978): Manias, Panics, and Crashes. London: MacMillan.  
24 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 
 12 
encourage short term profitability are certainly culpable, a more insidious 
explanation involves ill-considered federal policy. 
 It is possible that the choice to bear excessive leverage is an entirely 
rational managerial decision.  A comprehensive government safety net “may be 
an externality that drives a wedge between the privately optimal debt level and 
the debt level that is optimal for society as a whole.”25  The Federal Reserve’s 
lender-of-last-resort capability “could induce excessive risk-taking and excessive 
indebtedness under the presumption that the lender will step in during a liquidity 
crisis and provide the needed liquidity to the system.”26  If senior bankers believe 
that the government will step in during a crisis, they have less incentive to ensure 
maintenance of an appropriate leverage ratio.  In this case, the federal 
government (and by proxy taxpayers) bears the cost of a contagious systemic 
event.  
 Hunter and Marshall’s third source of systemic risk involves counterparty 
interconnectedness.  They argue that “an institution has both direct exposure to 
the creditworthiness of its direct counterparties, and indirect exposure to the 
creditworthiness of its counterparties’ counterparties, and so on.”27  By this 
reasoning, an institution can be susceptible to the credit risk of an entity it has no 
direct exposure to.  Both derivatives innovation and shadow banking 
relationships have increased the number and thickness of linkages between 
financial institutions.  Though Hunter and Marshall indicate that imperfect 
                                                
25 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 
26 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 
27 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 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information regarding counterparty exposures should be factored into risk 
management, measuring the credit risk of one’s counterparties is nearly 
impossible in an age of anonymous trading and the “Chinese wall”28 of the 
industry.   
 Many theorists also believe that sudden liquidity shortages often prompt 
systemic crises.  In this conception, broker dealers are the main liquidity 
providers in financial markets.  Any number of idiosyncratic events can cause one 
or many of the broker dealers to withdraw liquidity, which can “lead to a chain of 
defaults that freeze an entire market.”29  This theory, however, applies only as a 
result of institutional failure; it is one of the repercussions of a systemic crisis—
not an antecedent.  While a liquidity crisis will certainly dry up market 
confidence and may lead to one or more defaults, it is less a source of systemic 
risk and more a product of it.   
 In their fifth source of systemic risk, Hunter and Marshall invoke 
economic game theory in the description of coordination occurrences.  Though 
rare, scenarios where game theory coordination can be optimal are often 
extremely fragile.  As chronicled in Roger Lowenstein’s book When Genius 
Failed, the 1998 consorted bail out of Long Term Capital Management, a hedge 
fund that faced an extreme liquidity shortage as a result of extraordinary market 
movements against its positions.  As LTCM’s liquidity situation became 
                                                
28 Chinese Wall: this term describes the information barrier that prevents conflicts of interest within financial services firms; it separates those with material information from those who make investment decisions. 
29 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 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increasingly bleak, several of its counterparties “explored the possibility of 
mutually beneficial alternatives to default.”30  Instead of letting the fund go 
under, the group (led by JPMorgan, Merrill Lynch, and Salomon Smith Barney) 
agreed to recapitalize LTCM with $300 million dollar injections apiece.31  The 
entire consortium included 14 entities; the recapitalization totaled $3.625 billion.  
According the Hunter and Marshall, “absent this coordination, the rational 
decision for each individual creditor would have been to refrain from providing 
liquidity altogether.”32 
 Hunter and Marshall also extend their coordination analysis to include the 
Diamond-Dybvig model of bank runs.  The model stipulates that banks runs can 
occur when entities employ short-term debt to finance long-term assets.  If one 
lender does not expect any of its peers to extend liquidity, it may be the “lender’s 
best response to refuse to roll over its loans even if the firm would be solvent if all 
loans were rolled over.”33  Thus, an otherwise viable firm that faces a grievous 
liquidity crisis can be forced into insolvency.  Hunter and Marshall liken this 
phenomenon to the Asian crisis of 1997, wherein the “flight of foreign short-term 
capital was analogous to a Diamond-Dybvig bank run.”34  Such a coordination 
failure is an ominous and relevant source of systemic risk.   
                                                
30 Alan Greenspan and Robert. E. Rubin, Arthur Levitt, and Brooksley Born (1999): “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long‐Term Capital Management,” a Report of the President’s Working 
Group on Financial Markets. 
31 Société Générale pledged $125 million, while Lehman Brothers and Paribas pledged $100 million. 
32 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 
33 Douglas W. Diamond and Philip H. Dybvig (1983): “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity” in 
The Journal of Political Economy.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
34 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives,” etc. 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 The implications of systemic crises can be likened to the speedy contagion 
of an infectious disease epidemic.  The banking system is an interconnected web 
of interbank deposits, loans, and payment system clearings, which is also 
geometrically linked through service of the same deposit or loan markets.35  An 
adverse shock at what Hendricks calls a ‘systemically significant institution’ or 
SSI36 could result in the transmission of that shock to other institutions on the 
transmission chain.  Though firms “with sufficient capital to absorb the 
transmitted losses will remain solvent, they may be weakened”37 and this balance 
sheet weakness (and expectation of toxic exposure) can translate into a lack of 
confidence.  Moreover, the extent to which a firm leverages its assets has a direct 
correlation to its exposure to systemic shock; the more debt on an institution’s 
balance sheet, the easier it is for an adverse occurrence to drive that institution 
into insolvency.  Moreover, the recent growth and development of what has 
become known as the shadow banking industry has thickened the connections 
between depository commercial banks and other financial intermediaries such as 
investment banks, hedge funds, and money market funds.  Innovation in 
derivatives markets has paralleled the growth of shadow banking and also 
contributed to the interconnectedness of financial institutions.  As financiers, 
traders, and bankers have explored increasingly complicated means of financing 
they have developed financial products and institutional relationships that 
increase systemic susceptibility. 
                                                
35 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 
36 Hendricks, "Defining Systemic Risk." 2009. 
37 Kaufman and Scott, “What is Systemic Risk?” 2003. 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Successful explorations of systemic risk must address a wide variety of 
factors.  First it is important to undervalue the differentiation between chain 
reaction and common shock systemic risk: for all relevant purposes any systemic 
event will involve some blend of chain reaction collapse and reassessment 
irrationality.   Moreover, it is extremely important to evaluate the menace of 
systemic shocks.  In the liquidity crisis of 2007-2009, “all securities became 
highly correlated as all investors and funded institutions were forced to sell high 
quality assets [at depressed prices] in order to generate liquidity.”38  This 
precipitous scenario resulted in the financial system’s susceptibility to “[a] supply 
of poorly underwritten loans and structured securities,” which ultimately led to 
the failure of a group of institutions and “collapse of entire markets.”39  Though 
systemic risk cannot be easily quantified, it can result in a contagious chain 
reaction of institutional collapse, the near perfect correlation of seemingly 
unrelated financial instruments, and pervasive market irrationality.   
  
 
  
                                                
38 Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, et. al., “Shadow Banking,” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports: No. 458, July 2010), pg. 4. 
39 Poszar, Adrian, et al. “Shadow Banking,” pg. 4. 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1.3 
 
D E R I V A T I V E S    I N N O V A T I O N 
___ 
 
 
An overwhelming impetus to specialize security risk spawned widespread 
derivatives innovation in the 1980s.  Since then, Wall Street analysts have 
continued to design complex financial instruments at a breakneck pace.  In The 
Way into any Market, David Shirreff contends that “derivatives markets have 
turned the world’s capital markets into a global Olympic Games—every day, 
barriers are broken and records set.”40  A derivative product derives its value “in 
whole or in part from the performance of an underlying asset—including 
securities, currencies, commodities, rates, or indices of asset values.”41  Analysts 
have constructed many of these products using the four fundamental 
instruments: forwards, futures, options, and swaps.  Intermediaries trade 
derivatives over-the-counter (OTC) and on market exchanges such as the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange.   Non-financial and financial firms alike employ derivatives 
as cost-effective and flexible vehicles to hedge against unfavorable market 
movements. 
The sheer variety of derivatives available allows firms to manage unique 
risks or take speculative positions.  Forwards are contracts between two parties to 
                                                
40 David Shirreff (1983): “The Way into any Market,” in Euromoney, Nov. 1983, pp. 60. 
41 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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buy or sell a specified asset at a future date for a price agreed upon beforehand.  
Forwards typically trade over-the-counter.  Futures contracts are nearly identical 
to forwards, but trade on an exchange and have interim margin resettlements.  
These instruments are the simplest derivatives; options and swaps (and their 
incredibly elaborate progeny) are much more complicated.  Options give their 
owner the right—but not the obligation—to either buy or sell an asset at a 
predetermined price.  Moreover, swaps involve an exchange of cash flows 
between two counterparties, in which (typically) at least one party accepts a 
series of cash flows determined by a random variable—often interest rates, 
exchange rates, or commodity prices.  In an interest rate swap, for example, cash 
flows are “based on a ‘notional principal’ that is used to calculate the cash flow 
but is not exchanged.”42  At a predetermined date, the fixed-rate payer pays a 
coupon determined by the fixed interest rate stipulated in the contract—usually a 
premium over the appropriate Treasury rate.  At the same time, the floating-rate 
payer owes a payment based on the relevant floating rate—usually some spread43 
on the applicable LIBOR44 rate. Thus, swaps contracts allow firms to hedge 
against interest rate risk insofar as one firm absorbs market risk and its 
counterparty pays a premium for an assured fixed rate.   
The risk transferring capacity of these instruments allows for protection 
                                                
42 Gary Gorton and Richard Rosen (1995): “Banks and Derivatives”, an NBER Working Paper no. 5100. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
43 Spread: A spread is a rate difference. For example, a spread on the LIBOR rate (see 5) could be the addition of 25 basis points to whatever the rate might be (i.e. 1 year LIBOR plus 25 basis points: 0.79 + 0.025). 
44 LIBOR rate: the London Inter‐bank Offered Rate.  This is the reference rate at which banks can borrow unsecured funds from other banks in the London wholesale money market. 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from adverse price movements for both firms and investors.  Parties in 
derivatives contracts have the opportunity to “disaggregate risk, bear those risks 
they can manage, and transfer those they are unwilling to bear.”45  Moreover, the 
ability of financiers to tailor derivative products to specified needs allows 
participants “to hedge risk in a manner more closely resembling the actual risk 
that they are assuming than was ever possible with ordinary securities.”46  Thus, 
innovation in the derivatives sector has accompanied exponential growth in its 
market size.   According to the Bank for International Settlements, the over-the-
counter derivatives market reached a notional value of $670 trillion in 2008 (it 
has since contracted to $582 trillion).47  In 1992, the notional value of the OTC 
derivatives market was merely [sic] $10 trillion.48  According to William C. 
Hunter and David Marshall, “this dramatic growth has raised concerns about the 
complexity of these instruments and the ability of managers, regulators, and 
market participants to understand the risks associated with their use.”49  Thus, it 
is important to explore the risks associated with “rapid and frequent 
transformations”50 of firms’ off-balance sheet assets and liabilities. 
                                                
45 J. Carter Beese Jr. (1993): “Derivatives: Fundamentally Changing Corporate Finance, Asset Management... and the Retail Industry?” Remarks at 1993 Annual Meeting/Southern District Securities Industry Association. 
46 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? 
47 Bank for International Settlements (2010): “Table 19: Amounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives,” in 
BIS Quarterly Report, December 2010. 
48 Notional values do not indicate the riskiness of derivative positions; they are only applicable in regard to market structure.  
49 George Kaufman and Robert R. Bliss (2006): “Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Netting, Collateral, and Closeout” in Journal of Financial Stability 2 (2006). 
50 William C. Hunter and David Marshall (1999): “Thoughts on Financial Derivatives, Systematic Risk and Central Banking: A Review of Recent Developments,” a Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Working 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Part 1—Derivatives and Risk 
Derivatives allocate specialized risks to those willing to pay the lowest 
premium for associated exposure.  Though said risk has been “broken up and 
parceled out,”51 bearing parties remain exposed to a variety of risks both 
characteristic of less complex securities and unique to derivatives.  Scholars 
typically associate derivatives with market, liquidity, credit, and systemic risks.  
Some scholars contend that derivatives have different relationships to these risks 
than basic debt and equity instruments and thus require special attention from 
risk managers and regulators.   Some of their arguments stem from the reality 
that OTC trading is far less transparent than established exchange trading 
mechanisms.  As a result, some argue that regulators and managers cannot 
develop a clear understanding of the derivative market structure, the extremely 
rapid transformations that occur within it, or the concentration of positions 
within and beyond the industry.  Because the shadow-banking segment expanded 
along with derivatives innovation, the relative opaqueness of derivatives trading 
and market positions has grown exponentially. Thus, it is necessary to evaluate 
the relationship between derivatives and financial instability. 
For firms that trade derivatives, market risks can be extraordinary and 
lead to substantial losses.  Though derivatives are often used to hedge risk, they 
are very susceptible to adverse market movements that have little or no downside 
                                                                                                                                            Paper WP 99‐20. 
51 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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protection.  Moreover, when firms employ derivatives to speculate (trade for their 
own books), they can suffer staggering losses.  George Soros, the renowned 
investment manager, lost around $600 billion for his Quantum fund on 
European bond and currency options in 1994.52  Brian Hunter, a trader at hedge 
fund Amaranth Advisors, lost $6.5 billion betting on energy futures spreads in 
2006.  Jérôme Kerviel, an equity arbitrage trader at French bank Société 
Générale, lost €4.9 billion on directional stock index futures in 2008.  Losses in 
derivatives markets are not limited to financial services firms.  In 1994, Toyota 
incurred almost a billion dollar loss over six months attempting to hedge its 
foreign exchange risk.53  In 1996, Japan’s Sumitomo Corporation lost $3.46 
billion in the copper futures market.  Misguided derivatives trades have plagued 
seasoned financial houses’ proprietary traders as well as industrial and 
manufacturing firms merely attempting to hedge risks.  
An infamous example of the effect of derivative market risk occurred when 
Metalgesellschaft AG, a German engineering and commodities conglomerate, lost 
around $1.4 billion in an ill-advised effort to hedge with oil futures.  Despite 
reputedly being a “sophisticated trading outfit,” Metallgesellschaft’s losses 
triggered an enormous ($1.9 billion) bailout from creditors and resulted in the 
termination of about 5,000 jobs.54  The market implications were also 
                                                
52 Brett D. Fromson (1994): “Speculator Sees Possible Danger in Derivatives,” in Washington Post, April 14, 1994.  
53 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 
54 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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excruciating: “low oil prices were further depressed as the company attempted to 
liquidate its [massive] futures positions.”55  As a result of artificially depressed 
prices, oil refiners in the US eschewed hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue 
that they would have otherwise realized had Metallgesellschaft “stayed out of the 
hedging business.”56  Moreover, the issue divided financial scholars; some (Mello 
and Parsons) argued that the firm’s energy market trading “was largely 
speculative”57 and its position was “grossly oversized.”58 while others “claim that 
the firm employed a prudent and potentially very lucrative strategy of hedging 
long term energy delivery obligations with short-term futures and swaps.”59  
These flawed trades illustrate the staggering market exposure that occurs at the 
behest of derivatives instruments and trading strategies. 
Derivatives strategies are also subject to liquidity risk.  According to 
Waldman, “depth, breadth, and resiliency” characterize a liquid market.60  In 
derivatives markets, broker dealers are the chief liquidity providers; they sell, 
market, and create products.  As the Metallgesellschaft AG case illustrates, huge 
notional contracts can be difficult to liquefy, especially as a firm faces huge losses, 
                                                
55 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 
56 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 
57 Franklin R. Edwards and Michael S. Canter (1995): “The collapse of Metallgesellschaft: Unhedgeable risks, poor hedging strategy, or just bad luck?” in The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 15, Issue 3 (1995). 
58 Mark Wahrenburg (1995): “Hedging Oil Price Risk: Lessons from Metallgesellschaft” in The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 3, Issue 15. 
59 Stephen Craig Pirrong (1997): “Metallgesellschaft: A prudent hedger ruined, or a wildcatter on NYMEX?” in The Journal of Futures Markets, Vol. 17, Issue 5 (1997). 
60 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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and can exacerbate an unfavorable market movement.  While product liquidity is 
certainly a perceived concern, counterparty liquidity is of far greater interest.  
Though it may be impossible to perfectly perceive the liquidity of a market 
participant, the perception of illiquidity can erode a party’s willingness to interact 
with the illiquid participant.  Perceptions of illiquidity can lead to increased and 
unfavorable contract premiums as well as fears of counterparty risk, both of 
which can provoke increasing abstention (and decreasing liquidity). 
Liquidity risk also has interesting implications for delta—otherwise known 
as dynamic—hedging, a common risk management practice.  Instead of buying an 
option in exact opposition to a held position, delta61 hedging involves actively 
maintaining a dynamic hedge position by constantly realigning its notional 
position in proportion to a desired level of risk exposure.  This practice “allows 
for profits despite the existence of the hedge”62 and is thus applied by many firms 
(despite often-burdensome transaction costs).  The theoretical basis for delta 
hedging presupposes an entirely liquid market within which necessary 
adjustments to a delta position can be made.  During periods of market instability 
(most notably idiosyncratic systemic events), market liquidity can evaporate 
almost instantaneously and result in an environment in which delta hedging is no 
longer possible.  Such an environment would negate the intended purpose of the 
hedge, which is to shield an entity’s market exposure from high volatility cycles. 
                                                
61 The term delta refers to changes in instrument value with respect to changes in an underlying asset's price.  Those who employ delta hedging seek to maintain a constant delta measurement.   
62 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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Credit risk, which is similar to liquidity risk, is the “risk that a participant 
will default on contractual obligations to a counterparty, resulting in loss.”63  For 
exchange-traded products, a central clearing house (usually the exchange itself) 
guarantees all trades.  For OTC derivatives, which are traded between two (or 
three) counterparties, credit risk is not mitigated by a functional clearinghouse 
and must be considered when a trade occurs.  Measuring credit risk is a terribly 
complex process, which involves calculating the risk of replacing a counterparty’s 
contractual obligation should said party default.  To assign value to a defaulted 
contract, “one must calculate the value of all expected future cash flows that were 
erased by the default.”64  For risk managers, the evaluation of derivative credit 
risk requires estimates of a contract’s current exposure as well as forecasts of 
potential exposure.  Though current exposure is relatively simple to calculate, 
future exposure varies wildly and is extraordinarily difficult to measure.  
Volatility models and measurements require unrealistic assumptions, personal 
opinions, and a litany of interrelated variables.  Thus, replacement cost valuation 
can be incredibly fastidious and can dramatically affect gravely important credit 
risk models. 
Though credit risk has traditionally demanded concern from bankers and 
underwriters, it is even more significant for those who participate in derivatives 
markets.  Because some derivatives contracts span several years, involved parties 
                                                
63 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 
64 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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must carefully scrutinize the current and future creditworthiness of their 
collaborator over a longer period of time than other, more traditional banking 
functions.  By allowing for long-maturity derivative contracts, credit models also 
must account for a more diverse range of potential economic and financial 
scenarios and inherently more market volatility.  Some scholars assert that some 
financial services firms, who traditionally pinpoint short-term risks, “may look 
for short-term profits attached to unwanted long-term repercussions.”65  
Derivatives, especially those traded over-the-counter, exhibit credit risk 
properties rarely seen in other financial instruments. 
 
Part 2—Derivatives, Shadow Banking, and Systemic Risk 
 Due to the primacy of credit risk in OTC derivatives markets, institutional 
creditworthiness (and perceptions of it) often influence market participation.  For 
this reason, “the credit rating of an OTC derivatives dealer is more closely 
scrutinized than that of a stocks and bonds trader because the OTC derivatives 
dealer is an actual party to the contract.”66  The heightened value of credit scores 
for derivatives dealers has compelled executives to spin off subsidiary derivative-
specialized institutions shielded from their parents’ less appealing balance sheets.  
The development of these institutions (known as Derivatives Products 
Companies) was a fundamental precursor to the rise of the shadow banking 
                                                
65 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 
66 Adam R. Waldman (1994): OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risk: Innovative Finance or the Dance into the Abyss? in (43) American University Law Review 1023 (1994). 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system.  Thus, shadow banking and derivatives instruments are inexorably 
linked—the unique demands of the OTC derivative sector provided the rationale 
for the inception of a non-regulated system of specialized financial institutions, 
which expanded rapidly thereafter.   
 The unsecured and undisclosed nature of these off-balance sheet 
endeavors has significant implications for systemic risk theory.  In the case of an 
extremely adverse market movement, there is a risk that a significant player 
could default on its contractual obligations to make payments, which would 
result in a cascade of defaults throughout the system.  The relative concentration 
of derivatives dealers among several banks (and their subsidiaries) would only 
exacerbate such contagion.  Moreover, the long-term maturity of instruments and 
the interconnected nature of swap obligations can tie firms’ fates together in 
incomprehensible ways and increasing the likelihood of such a collapse.  The 
threat of substantial derivatives losses disrupting market functionality and 
causing a payment default meltdown is considerable. 
 Many financial services firms employ derivatives for speculative, 
proprietary trades that are often unhedged.  While often bolstering a firm’s 
bottom line, a heavy reliance on proprietary trading can lead to devastating 
collapse.  In addition, derivatives hedging strategies often rely on misguided 
theories of liquidity.  In adverse market conditions, when hedges are most 
valuable, absolute liquidity required to execute a position may not be available.  It 
is easy to conceive of a systemic scenario in which the default of a few firms 
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precludes other firms (who may be completely liquid and solvent) from executing 
hedges to protect from the market’s reaction to said defaults.  Moreover, as a 
result of delta hedging strategies, other seemingly healthy firms could further 
depress asset prices by rebalancing their hedge portfolios in response to a 
collapsing market. The intensifying implications of derivative instruments on 
financial crises are stark.   
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1.4 
 
S H A D O W   B A N K I N G 
___ 
 
 
 
In the early twentieth century, the United States government established 
both the Federal Reserve System (1913) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (1933) to reduce the likelihood of bank runs. Thus, the government 
established public sector oversight for the traditional banking sector, which is 
comprised of depository institutions like commercial banks, savings and loans, 
credit unions, and industrial loan companies, through deposit insurance and 
liquidity provisions.  According to New York Fed economists Zoltan Pozsar and 
Tobias Adrian, regulatory programs like the FDIC safeguard large traditional 
banks from the “risks inherent in reliance on short term funding by granting 
them access to liquidity and credit put options in the form of liquidity backstops 
from the discount window and deposit insurance.”67  Another sector of finance 
has risen to rival the value and viability of the traditional banking sector in the 
past 25 years.  Non-depository institutions such as investment banks (and their 
holding companies), hedge funds, and money market funds have evolved into a 
shadow banking system that intermediates credit, provides liquidity, and 
operates with limited regulation.  
                                                
67 Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian et. al., “Shadow Banking,” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports: No. 458, July 2010), pgs. 2‐9. 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The emergence of a parallel, esoteric banking system is a consequence of 
two critical developments in the financial sector.  First, the widespread growth of 
derivative securities over the past quarter century has exponentially increased the 
demand for collateral on margin.  Second (and not unrelated to the first 
development), financiers have begun to securitize-and-distribute a tremendous 
amount of loans into the capital markets.68  By securitizing debt, banks were able 
to issue bonds that would serve as collateral for repurchase agreements, “freeing 
other categories of assets for use as collateral in derivatives transactions and for 
use in settlement systems.”69  This phenomenon began in the late 1990s and 
allowed firms to vastly increase their leverage.   
 
Figure 1: Shadow Bank Liabilities vs. Traditional Bank Liabilities 
                                                
68 Gary Gorton (2009): “Slapped in the Face By the Invisible Hand,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Jekyll Island Conference Proceedings. 
69 Gorton (2009): “Slapped in the Face By the Invisible Hand.” 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The arrival of shadow banking infrastructure, though unbeknownst to 
everyday investors, allowed for the development of a vastly complex credit 
intermediation and enhancement process. Analysts attribute the term itself to 
Paul McCulley, a portfolio manager at PIMCO, who advocates Keynesian 
economics.70  This mechanism “provides savers with information and risk 
economies of scale in screening and monitoring borrowers and by facilitating 
investments in a more diverse loan portfolio.”71  Credit intermediation involves 
credit transformation, which is the enhancement of the credit quality of debt; 
maturity transformation, which refers to the use of short-term deposits to fund 
long-term loans—creating liquidity for the saver; and liquidity transformation, 
which is the use of liquid instruments to fund illiquid assets.72  This process can 
occur at the behest of the government directly—on depository institutions’ 
balance sheets—or indirectly through conduit entities, affiliated hedge funds, 
money market funds, and securities lending practices.   
In the shadow banking system, the credit intermediation process occurs at 
the same time through “a daisy-chain of non-bank financial intermediaries”—a 
process that includes loan origination, loan warehousing, ABS73 issuance, ABS 
warehousing, ABS CDO74 issuance, ABS intermediation, and wholesale funding.  
                                                
70 Paul McCulley, “Teton Reflections,” in PIMCO Global Central Bank Focus, 2007. 
71 Poszar, Adrian, et al. “Shadow Banking,” pg. 7. 
72 Poszar, Adrian, et al. “Shadow Banking,” pg. 8—“What Is Shadow Credit Intermediation?” 
73 Asset‐backed security: an ABS’ value and payments are derived from and collateralized by an instrument (or instruments) such as a loan, lease, or other receivable.  
74 Collateralized debt obligation: CDOs are structured ABS products whose value and payments are derived from a portfolio of debt instruments. originators will split a CDO into tranches determined by riskiness. 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Different types of shadow institutions perform each of these distinct operational 
techniques (see figure 2 below).   
 
Figure 2: Shadow Credit Intermediation75 
 
This mechanism melds non-depository institutions into a credit intermediation 
network, which “forms the backbone of the shadow banking system.”76  The 
intermediation process transforms the credit quality of loans: what begins as a 
long-term, somewhat-hazardous loan becomes a marketable repackaged security 
that offers liquidity and transparency.  According to Pozsar and Adrian, the 
shadow banking system is “a system which reallocates the three functions of 
banks77 across a variety of specialist, non-bank financial intermediaries with 
distinct competitive advantages.”78 
 The shadow banking system contains three particular organizational 
classes: the government-sponsored sub-system, the internal sub-system, and the 
                                                
75 CP: 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78 Poszar, 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et 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Banking,” 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19. 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external sub-system.  These entities secure funding through the wholesale 
funding market—a series of issuances, mainly involving money market 
instruments, medium-term notes, and public bonds.  This funding system is 
indelibly susceptible to market idiosyncrasies and credit freezes, both of which 
threaten the stability of the shadow banking system.  
The Federal Home Loan Banks, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae 
comprise the government-sponsored segment of the shadow banking system.   
The development of these organizations has both fundamentally altered the 
banking industry and allowed for the development of shadow banking.   Instead 
of originating loans and holding them to term, these government-sponsored 
enterprises instituted a “securitization-based, originate-to-distribute credit 
intermediation process.”79  GSEs provide term loan warehousing to banks, while 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac provide credit insurance and securitize and 
distribute loans.  According to Pozsar and Adrian, these techniques garnered 
interest from both banks and non-banks and became widely adopted in their 
credit intermediation and funding practices.  Moreover, these institutions are 
held off of the government’s balance sheet (Fannie Mae had been privatized prior 
to re-nationalization in 2008 in the wake of the housing crisis), but still hold an 
implicit government guarantee—much like an SPV.80  It is necessary to mention 
that the government-sponsored sector of the shadow banking system does not 
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80 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originate loans; it focuses on loan processing and funding.81  Despite implicit 
government support, these entities provided the foundation of and 
methodological basis for the shadow banking system. 
Over the past thirty years, the traditional banking sector has radically 
refashioned its constitution.  The largest banks have traditionally relied on 
depository funds and loan origination for revenue and managed exposure to 
credit risk.  These firms have since begun to emphasize loan securitization, the 
wholesale funding process, and fee-based initiatives, while their risk 
management has shifted its exposure to market risk.  Under the auspices of “bank 
holding companies,” traditional banks aggregated asset management, broker-
dealer, and other specialist functions under one banner.  This allowed banks “to 
transform their traditional process of hold-to-maturity, spread banking to a more 
profitable process of originate-to-distribute, fee-banking.”82  Management 
transferred a vast majority of the credit intermediation process into newly held, 
semi-unregulated specialized subsidiaries—giving rise to the shadow banking 
industry.  By shifting the role of loans—from originate-to-hold to originate-to-
securitize, bankers fundamentally altered the nature of credit risk.   
Fundamentally, banks no longer lent on the basis of creditworthiness, but 
on the ability of their salespeople to make a market for securitized loans and 
distribute them accordingly.  This became the basis for a “securitization-based 
                                                
81 Poszar, Adrian, et al. “Shadow Banking,” pg. 22. 
82 Poszar, Adrian, et al. “Shadow Banking,” pg. 24. 
 34 
shadow credit intermediation program,”83 which allowed for the pursuit of 
unhealthy lending practices through subsidiaries with lenient capital 
requirements, oversight, and regulation. Thus, lending and credit intermediation 
processes spanning the globe now relied on networks of bank holding companies, 
their specialized subsidiaries, wholesale funding, and international capital 
markets.  
The external shadow banking system is very similar to the internal system, 
but is dominated by non-aggregated specialized finance houses.   These 
independent actors adopted the practical combination of bank and market-based 
credit intermediation employed by bank holding companies (BHCs) and grew 
into an interconnected network of intermediaries that operated beyond the 
regulatory and insurance purview of the banking sector. The credit 
intermediation processes of broker-dealers and non-bank specialist 
intermediaries, along with backstops provided by risk repositories, comprise the 
external shadow banking system.84  Broker-dealers, such as Bear Stearns, 
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, exploited 
lax leverage limits to conduct activities similar to those within the internal 
system, but at higher multiples and with riskier products like subprime 
mortgages and leveraged loans.  These broker-dealers utilized repo funding, 
internal hedge funds, and proprietary trading desks to fund their loan pools and 
credit assets.  A juxtaposition of the external and internal shadow banking 
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systems reveals that only one set of broker dealer subsidiaries “were backstopped 
by the Federal Reserve and FDIC,” while “the numerous other subsidiaries that 
were involved in the origination, processing, and movement of loans and 
structured credits” were not.85  Moreover, the non-bank specialist (hedge funds, 
money market mutual funds, independent structured investment vehicles) credit 
intermediation process involved riskier non-conforming loans, an originate-to-
fund process, and dependency on access to broker-dealer and BHC capital 
markets desks and lender-of-last-resort functions.  The internal and external 
shadow banking credit extension processes were inextricably connected and 
incredibly convoluted.  The external process, however, existed behind closed 
doors and away from the purview of regulatory oversight.  
Just as independent specialists relied on BHCs and broker-dealers for 
market intermediacy, BHCs and broker-dealers depended heavily on credit risk 
repositories to provide risk and insurance capital for the securitization process.  
These entities, such as mortgage insurers, subsidiaries of large insurance 
companies, credit hedge funds, and credit derivative specialists, “absorbed the 
tail risk out of loan pools processed through the shadow banking system,”86 
making these loans and asset backed securities perceivably credit-risk free.  In 
the lead up to the 2007 crisis, a self-reinforcing cycle emerged wherein the 
liabilities of shadow banking institutions themselves were deemed high quality 
due to the perceived quality of their underlying collateral—the AAA-rated 
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tranches of ABCPs and ABSs.  These entities typically utilized short-term credit 
conduits in money markets to secure their long term funding.  When credit 
markets turned arid in 2008, shadow institutions were unable to roll over their 
short-term securitizations and finance their long-term assets and obligations, 
which triggered a contagious run on the shadow banking system. 
In the wake of the 2008 crisis, government interference had a paradoxical 
and indeterminate effect on the shadow system.  While many shadow institutions 
(typically those with exorbitant leverage) failed when they were unable to secure 
funding, those with “reasonable leverage and a diverse set of funding options”87 
persevered.  However, ambiguous intercession on the part of the Treasury 
Department and broker-dealers allowed for the survival of inferior institutions 
and the failure of some well-run, seemingly sound shadow banks.   Though these 
failures require attention on a case-by-case basis, disproportional access to last 
resort funding (and thus relationships with bulge-bracket parent firms) seems to 
be a common theme.  The fickle nature of this infrastructure reveals a defect in 
the mammoth shadow banking system.  Because wholesale funding 
(characterized by institutional cash balances) is extremely unstable and 
institutional investors are hypersensitive, the asymmetries of shadow funding 
engender ominous fault lines that spread across all three sub-systems of the 
shadow industry.  In the past, this precariousness has resulted in contagious runs 
on the shadow banking system—some of which have spawned systemic 
instability.   
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1.5 
 
S E C U R I T I Z A T I O N   A N D   S U B P R I M E 
___ 
 
 
In 2000, Congress passed the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, 
which effectively eliminated OTC derivatives from regulatory purview.  The 
number of traded contracts exploded in the year period during which Congress 
enacted the legislation and have grown rapidly since.  Moreover, the legislation, 
which Congress enacted in the last days of the Clinton Administration, opened 
the door for an innovation boom in both financial instrument engineering and 
institutional development.  The practice of securitization, which entails pooling 
and repackaging contractual debt, expanded rapidly at Wall Street institutions, 
insurance securities firms, and lenders.  Wall Street firms enjoyed two unique 
benefits from the securitization process.  First, securitization allowed 
management to dump pools and tranches of ungainly loans into special purpose 
vehicles or other shadow banking entities, thereby removing these assets from 
their balance sheets.  This development effectively reduced firms’ capital 
requirements and released cash reserves.  Moreover, the securitization process 
allowed firms to pool fixed income assets with different risk characteristics, 
thereby reducing idiosyncratic risk and diversifying loan pools.  The rise of 
securitization was a boon for Wall Street; it allowed for the growth of a nearly 
trillion-dollar market and record profits across the industry.   
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Lenders began to sell mortgages to investment banks and other shadow 
institutions who then pooled and tranched thousands of mortgages, car loans, 
and other fixed income assets into collateralized debt obligations.  This process is 
diagrammed in Figure 3: 
Moreover, further financial innovation allowed banks to create specialized CDOs 
and tranches of CDOs for different investors’ specific needs.  As structured, asset-
backed securities, CDOs are split into tranches—different risk classes—whereby 
interest and principle payments are made on a seniority basis and premiums 
rates compensate for increased risk.  On average, bankers would divide CDOs 
into seven or eight tranches, with 2 or 3 “senior” level AAA rated tranches and 
several riskier tranches (rated A, BBB, and below).  In this way, CDOs allowed 
institutional investors, who could only have exposure to investment-grade 
Figure 3: Securitization Chain  
(Source: Internationaltaxreview.com) 
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products, to “gain exposure to assets that, on their own, had been too risky.”88  
The riskier tranches appealed to investors with higher risk-return appetites.  The 
CDO market grew exponentially from 2001 to 2007—issuance grew globally from 
around $78 billion in 2001 to more than $420 billion in 2007.89 
From 2000 to 2007, as interest rates steadily decreased, more and more 
people implicitly gained access to mortgage lending.  The nature of this 
expansion, unfortunately, would prove rotten.  The most credit-worthy 
individuals (as determined by banks and lenders) were previously able to access 
prime mortgage loans.  However, the extremely profitable ABS securitization 
machine compelled lenders (banks, thrifts, etc.) to lend money to subprime 
borrowers, or those with a riskier profile and higher probability of default, 
because they could sell the expected cash flows to an SPV for securitization. 
According to Robert Gnaizda, former policy director for the Greenlining Institute, 
“all of the incentives that the financial institutions offered to their mortgage 
brokers were based on selling the most profitable products.”90  The subprime 
market grew rapidly from 2002 to 2005, as lenders like Countrywide, 
Ameriquest, and New Century realized record profits.  
The rise of securitization was a boon for credit rating agencies.  The three 
most prominent CRAs, Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch, charged fees to 
assess the risk involved with CDO tranches, as they had done traditionally for 
                                                
88 Anna Katherine Barnett-Hart (2009): The Story of the CDO Market Meltdown: An Empirical 
Analysis. Harvard College: Department of Economics—Honors Thesis. 
89 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (2010): “Global CDO Issuance.” 
90 Inside Job (2010): directed by Christopher Ferguson. New York: Sony Pictures Classics. 
 40 
corporate and sovereign debt instruments.  In the mid 2000s, a flourishing base 
of CDO investors relied heavily on the ratings produced by these firms to assess 
the riskiness of CDO tranches.  As the demand for CDOs spiked, “the rating 
agencies came under enormous pressure to quickly crank out CDO ratings, while 
the market exploded faster than the number or knowledge of analysts.”91  The 
CRAs developed risk assessment models to churn out CDO ratings.  Many of 
these models were premised on the movements and characteristics of other 
bonds due to the lack of historical information regarding CDOs.  Adjustments to 
these models were made “haphazardly”92 based on the nature of the instrument.  
Investor overreliance on credit ratings, especially those predicated on the risks 
associated with corporate bonds, resulted in widespread optimism about the CDO 
boom.  Investors and ratings analysts alike failed to account for portfolio risk, 
downturn correlation, and loss-given-default characteristics specific to CDOs—
especially RMBSs93.   
 As the demand for CDOs increased, financial engineers sought inventive 
new ways of satisfying the appetite of the industry’s ravenous securitization 
machine.  Using the same principles of innovation that drove the derivatives 
boom, these analysts cooked up significantly more complex instruments, 
including CDOs-squared94 and synthetic CDOs95.  Around the same time in 2004, 
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the Securities and Exchange Commission relaxed capital ratio requirements for 
the 5 major broker dealers (also the five largest shadow institutions), who 
responded by systematically increasing their debt financing.  
 
Figure 4: Leverage among significant financial institutions96  
(Source: Economist Intelligence Unit) 
 
With a more lenient capital requirement, the broker dealers borrowed up to 33 
times their asset base.  According to Daniel Alpert, a hedge fund manager, this 
degree of leverage “meant that a tiny 3% decrease in the value of their asset base 
could leave them insolvent.”97  While leverage certainly fueled the securitization 
chain and magnified profits, it also overexposed these institutions to an 
idiosyncratic systemic shock. 
 One can easily draw a parallel between the over-levered investment banks 
                                                                                                                                            mezzanine CDO tranches that form a highly rated bond.  The repackaged tranches were typically risky, though their pooling resulted in a much higher rating. 
95 A synthetic CDO is a pool of credit default swap contracts. It generates payments similar to that of an ABS CDO, but does not require asset ownership. 
96 Notice that institutions with commercial banking practices (JPMorgan, Citi, and Bank of America) and accompanying oversight maintained relatively low leverage ratios. 
97 Quoted in Inside Job (2010): directed by Christopher Ferguson. New York: Sony Pictures Classics. 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in 2007 to the extreme leverage employed by Long Term Capital Management, a 
notable hedge fund, in the late 90s. By employing a cachet of academic and 
financial prodigies, LTCM was able to attract substantial institutional 
investments and demand favorable spreads from its broker and lenders.  On Wall 
Street, traders at the major banks revered LTCM’s pedigree and feared its 
potential.  After initial fundraising (no doubt bolstered by an elite roster of 
traders) in 1994, Long Term began trading with around $1.25 billion under 
management.   
By December 1995, LTCM boss John Meriwether had employed a bold 
investment strategy to grow the fund’s assets under management to around $102 
billion.  It seemed that the highly lauded cast of traders and economists were 
invincible--or at least vastly superior to their hedge fund peers.  Meriwether’s 
strategy involved fixed income arbitrage, spread arbitrage, and pairs trading to 
collect thin spreads on otherwise profit-less margins.  To make a profit, he 
exploited the firm’s unique reputation to massively leverage its balance sheet and 
amplify thin spreads into astounding profits. For instance, in its best year, the 
firm managed $4.7 billion dollars of equity and borrowed an astonishing $128 
billion on top of its assets.  In 1997, Long Term’s quantitative analysts ran out of 
bond arbitrage spreads to trade on and were forced to adopt a more aggressive 
trading strategy in order to maintain high returns, which resulted in a $460 
million dollar loss over May and June.   
Long Term’s downfall came in the next year; when it began to turn away 
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investors in order to greedily keep more profits in house.  In an ironic twist of 
fate, as a Russian bond crisis aggravated markets, Meriwether’s equity reserves 
depleted as a result of collateral calls.  When the rest of the industry caught wind 
of LTCM’s positions, traders began to prey on its high leverage and Long Term’s 
liquidity began to dry up.   In order to pay its collateral obligations, Long Term 
had to sell many of its long-term positions at a tremendous loss, further 
exacerbating the pressure on its overstretched capital.  
Due to the complexity and sheer volume of its derivative contracts (almost 
every bank in the world was an LTCM counterparty), the New York Fed feared 
that Long Term’s collapse would rattle the foundations of the financial system--
and possibly take a few banks down with it.  When asked about the possible 
collapse of Long Term, the President of the New York Fed, William McDonough, 
admitted that “markets would ... possibly cease to function.”98 McDonough 
orchestrated a bailout of LTCM for $3.625 billion that included nearly every bank 
on the Street.  The original partners lost their entire $1.9 billion stake in LTCM, 
but the financial system escaped nearly unscathed due to the Fed’s rescue plan 
and cooperation among Wall Street giants.  Though the banks who invested 
capital were largely paid back in the ensuing years, the fund’s partners felt the ill 
effects of speculative failure and many of their careers largely ended.  Soon after, 
Merrill Lynch analysts released a report condemning reliance on mathematical 
models such as those utilized by LTCM’s traders. 
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 The differences between LTCM’s rise and fall and that of the investment 
banks are stark, but some of the basic characteristics remain.  After developing an 
extremely profitable strategy, both the banks and LTCM took on massive loads of 
debt in order to dramatically increase exposures and thereby amplify profits—as 
long as things were going well so to speak.  The LTCM case has increasingly 
significant parallels with the eventual bail out of Bear Stearns, which occurred in 
March, months prior to the widespread hysteria of September and October 2008.  
Spurred on by rumors of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s massive mortgage losses, 
investors pummeled financial stocks in late February and early March 2008.  
They hounded on rumors that Bear was floundering under the weight of a 
massive mortgage portfolio, much like traders preyed on the (true) estimation 
that LTCM’s arbitrage strategies had moved against them.  By trading against 
LTCM’s positions, its competitors widened its convergence bets so much so that 
most of LTCM’s capital was effectively tied up in margin calls.  Market fickleness 
and the Wall Street rumor machine played a huge role in expediting the collapse 
of both LTCM and Bear Stearns.  
 The rhetoric surrounding Bear Stearns’ collapse was eerily similar to that 
regarding Long Term Capital.  By Wednesday March 12th, as its customers 
withdrew funds and its liquidity began to dry up, Bear began to send out feelers 
for an emergency loan.  Fed officials, including Tim Geithner, held a conference 
call with Hank Paulson and his undersecretary Robert Steel in Washington.  
Geithner argued that Bear’s failure would be “catastrophic for money market 
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funds, rile the derivatives markets,” and could lead to a wider systemic collapse, 
which was “exactly what Paulson and Bernanke had been fearing.”99  All of the 
regulators feared that the spillover effects of a Bear Stearns default would 
threaten other Wall Street firms and “lead to a broader panic, as had occurred 
during the LTCM meltdown.”100  Moreover, much like LTCM had turned away 
investors shortly before collapsing, Bear defied J.C. Flowers and Company’s101 
recommendation the previous summer to engage in a stock sale to raise capital. 
 Bear Stearns survived the failure of its internal hedge funds—the first 
casualties of the mortgage crash—in the summer of 2007, but would succumb to 
the collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac the following February.  At the 
behest of Paulson and others at Treasury, Fannie and Freddie became the 
conduits with which the government would attempt to keep the mortgage 
securitization machine afloat. By forcing Fannie and Freddie to “raise capital by 
selling stock faster than they lost it in mortgages,”102 regulators unwittingly drove 
financial stocks into the ground in late February of 2008.  Bear was hit the 
hardest; its stock price began the year at $85.30 (with a 52 week high of $172), 
began the month of March at $70.10, and plunged to $63 by Monday March 10th.  
Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers’ stocks lost about 15% of their value over the 
same period.  Bear’s extremely high leverage ($11.1 billion in equity capital 
supporting around $395 billion in assets) required about $10 billion of overnight 
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financing to operate, and rumors abounded about the firm’s supposed cash 
shortage.103 
 
 
Figure 5: Bear Stearns 52-week stock price 
Source: Thomson Reuters 
 
 Despite harsh denials and media appearances by CEO Alan Schwartz, Bear 
was unable to quell the liquidity rumors and began to lose customers.  As its cash 
reserves began to dry up, Bear’s management implored JPMorgan chief Jamie 
Dimon for a $30 billion dollar emergency loan.104  He promised to help, but 
noted that the government would also have to step in.  On Friday March 14th, the 
New York Fed reached a deal with JPMorgan and Bear Stearns: the Fed would 
make a loan to JPMorgan, who would then extend a secured line of credit to Bear.  
Though seemingly stable, this new source of financing did little to quell investor 
confidence and Bear’s stock plunged to $30 at market close Friday afternoon.   
Fed officials feared that the failure of Bear Stearns would trigger a 
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meltdown across the entire financial services industry—and intervened to prevent 
Bear’s bankruptcy.  Paulson eventually brokered a deal wherein JPMorgan would 
acquire Bear Stearns for $2 per share.  Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan, 
agreed to assume Bear’s trades (so Bear could continue operating in the interim) 
provided that the government would “finance $29 billion of Bear’s most 
problematic [mortgage] assets.”105  News broke about the JPMorgan’s purchase 
at 6 o’clock p.m. on Sunday, March 16th.  Though JPMorgan would later tack $8 
onto its purchase price, the sale of Bear Stearns for $2 per share—as orchestrated 
by the government—was a striking departure from its 52-week high of $160 per 
share (even the adjusted $10 per share—or $1.2 billion—was grossly discounted).  
The consummated deal (at $2 per share) indicated a 93% discount on Bear’s 
market capitalization as of the previous Friday.  In fact, the original $236.2 
million dollar purchase price was a steep discount on Bear’s NYC headquarters 
building alone, which had itself been valued at $1.1 billion—and cost $700 
million to build.  Though the rescue drew ire from many pundits, they recognized 
that it was “aimed at averting a Bear Stearns bankruptcy and a spreading crisis of 
confidence in the global financial system.”106  Critics contended that “the Bear 
rescue seemed to promise a helping hand to the next financial firm, now matter 
how reckless, that came running for help.”107  
Section 2.1 will build a foundational game theory model of contagious 
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financial crises.  Though simplified, it will reveal the fragility of the largest 
shadow banking institutions and their sources of financing.  Moreover, the model 
in Section 2.1 will illustrate and evaluate the role of government in systemic 
crises.  In particular, it will explore different policy responses and interventions 
in light of their ability to mitigate the risk of systemic collapse.  Section 2.2 will 
continue this delineation of the subprime crisis through the prism of Section 2.1’s 
fragility model.  Section 2.2 will analyze the series of events that began with Bear 
Stearns’ collapse and culminated in the widespread bailout of the financial 
services industry with taxpayer funds.   
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2.1 
 
M O D E L I N G   I N S T A B I L I T Y 
___ 
 
 
 
  This model of systemic contagion will rely significantly on the work of 
Roger Lagunoff and Stacey Schreft (1998).  It will also build heavily on the work 
of Diamond and Rajan (2009), Adrian and Brunnermeier (2010), and Huang, 
Zhou, and Zhu (2009). This game theory stochastic model of financial contagion 
revolves around a set of financial institutions (I will include major pre-crisis 
“banking” institutions—bank holding companies and investment banks). 
Financial institutions own assets that generate a return (mortgage backed 
securities, CDOs, or some mix thereof—which for the sake of this model will be 
considered one asset class) and require period-to-period financing, details of 
which will remain unspecified (e.g. overnight paper, term loan, or repo 
agreement).  This model will also include a set of investors that provide financing 
options for the financial institutions.  For the sake of the model, these investment 
entities can choose between lending to a financial institution (a risky investment) 
and investing in a safe asset. 
 At time T an investor’s portfolio allocation will be (ax,t, ay,t, as,t), where x 
and y refer to specific financial institutions and s refers to the safe asset. Each 
investor must allocate its portfolio in one of four ways.  An investor can have an 
undiversified portfolio of risky investments in one financial institution: (2,0,0) or 
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(0, 2, 0).  An investor may also be completely invested in the safe asset, with a 
portfolio allocated (0, 0, 2).  Further, an investor could have a fully diversified 
portfolio with risky investments in two different financial institutions: (1, 1, 0).  
Finally, an investor can have a risky-safe mixed portfolio constructed in one of 
the following ways: (1, 0, 1) or (0, 1, 1).  An investor’s return will be: r (ax,T, ay,T, 
as,T).  If an institution does not fail during the period, it pays a return to the 
investor at the end of that period.  Investments in financial institutions are made 
at Tn and realized at Tn+1.   
Investors (sources of financing) will become insolvent if hit with an iid108 
shock at any point T ≥ 0.  Shocks can either hit an investor(s) or an institution(s).  
Let us assume initially that institutions hit with shocks will default on their 
payment obligations to investors and investors hit with shocks will not provide 
financing to institutions.  It is also important to note that each institution must 
have two separate sources of intraperiod financing in order to remain operable.  
Assuming that the critical level of funding is  for each institution, the expected 
return to investors can be described as:  
{0 with probability q;  with probability 1-q at T = 1 
{  if at T > 1, N ≥ 2 
{o if at T > 1, N < 2 
Where q is the probability that an institution is hit by a shock and N is the 
                                                
108 Independently and identically distributed, random. 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number of investors.  (This is subject to alteration when post-shock asset sales 
are introduced).  
 Let us assume that at T = 0, an investor with $2 prefers a maximum return 
diversified portfolio (1, 1, 0) with both loans made to suitably funded institutions.  
To clarify, each investor loans $1 to each of two institutions and each institution 
receives $1 from each of two investors. This results in a web-like chain structure 
of institutions and their financiers.  A closed chain (one unaffected by shocks) is a 
set of institutions and investors such that each institution (A-D) is fully funded, 
each investor (1-4) diversified, and each participant linked in some way.  A closed 
chain will look something like this:  
 
Figure 6: A Closed Chain109 
 
 Financial Institution 
 Investor 
 
Moreover, when a shock hits one of the investors (keep in mind that the term 
“investor” abstractly refers to any source of financing for a financial institution 
and is not in fact an actual “investor) in a chain, it begins to unravel and results in 
an open chain.  Shocks will only occur at T≥0: 
                                                
109 Roger D. Lagunoff and Stacy L. Schreft. 1997: A Model of Financial Fragility. Presented at the Game Theory and Information series (EconWPA). 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Figure 2—A Closed Chain
More precisely, the figure shows a closed four-link chain because the chain links each
investor either directly or indirectly to four projects.  Investor A, for example, is directly linked to the
two investors nearest to him, investors B and D, because his portfolio contains loans to finance
projects 1 and 4, projects to which B and D, respectively, also lent funds.  He also is indirectly linked
to the remaining investor, investor C, because although his portfolio has no assets in common with
C’s, C’s portfolio has assets in common with B’s and D’s.
The iid shocks that occur at the initial date turn closed chains into open chains.  An open
chain is a set of entrepreneurs (projects) and investors such that at least one project is fully funded,
A!   1 !B
"
"4 2"
D! !C
Figure 3—An Open Chain
each investor is fully invested but not necessarily diversified, and the investors’ portfolios are all
linked directly or indirectly.  Figure 3 above depicts the open three-link chain that results when
project 3 in Figure 2 fails.
An additional assumption is needed on portfolio preferences to determine the implications of
" = entrepreneur (project)
! = investor
" = entrepreneur (project)
! = investor
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Figure 7: An Open Chain2 
 
When a liquidity shock hits, institutions need to meet demands for cash 
from other counterparties (for commercial banks, this would most likely be 
depositors; for investment banks, it could be margin calls on derivative contracts 
or any other payment obligation).  After a shock occurs, an institution can sell off 
a fraction of its assets (dZ, where Z represents the firm’s total assets and d is the 
proportion of total assets to be sold) at t+1 for price P0 per unit of at-maturity 
face value to an entity not explicitly or immediately affected by the liquidity shock 
(a hedge fund, bank with longer term liabilities, or private equity firm, etc.)  This 
is a suboptimal decision; however, because the asset sale in expectation of a 
liquidity shortage will occur at a depressed price.  If holding the assets to 
maturity allows the institution to realize a return of 1, selling them at T = 0 for 
price P0 gives a return P0 < 1.  [For prospective buyers with longer term (or 
“unlimited”) liability, purchasing the depressed assets is a risky investment, but 
one their appetite for risk is willing to consider—it is profitable to purchase an 
asset at depressed price P0 < 1, hold it to maturity, and realize a return of 1.]  By 
meeting its liquidity demand; however, the bank is able to attract necessary 
short-term funding to remain operable during the period, until the next 
reallocation of funds occurs, as illustrated below: 
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More precisely, the figure shows a closed four-link chain because the chain links each
investor either directly or indirectly to four projects.  Investor A, for example, is directly linked to the
two investors nearest to him, investors B and D, because his portfolio contains loans to finance
projects 1 and 4, projects to which B and D, respectively, also lent funds.  He also is indirectly linked
to the remaining investor, investor C, because although his portfolio has no assets in common with
C’s, C’s portfolio has assets in common with B’s and D’s.
The iid shocks that occur at the initial date turn closed chains into open chains.  An open
chain is a set of entrepreneurs (projects) and investors such that at least one project is fully funded,
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each investor is fully invested but not necessarily diversified, and the investors’ portfolios are all
linked directly o  indirectly.  Figure 3 above depicts t e open three-link chain that results when
project 3 in Figure 2 fails.
An additional assumption is needed on portfolio preferences to determine the implications of
" = entrepreneur (project)
! = investor
" = entrepreneur (project)
! = investor
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Figure 8: Re-closed chain after asset sale 
 
 
Let us also assume for the sake of the model that institutions may only 
engage in an asset sale at one point during the time period of the model.  That is, 
it is impossible for an institution to sell off a major portion of its assets at 
depressed prices more than once, as a function of the high leverage ratios 
common among such institutions.  In figure 3, after a shock knocked out investor 
3, institutions C and D faced a lack of funding.  They sold off a fraction d of their 
assets Z to investor 5 in order to obtain cash.  Let investor 5 be an extraneous, 
special class of investor (a hedge fund, bank with longer term liabilities, or 
private equity group) with a different risk appetite than investors 1-4.  For the 
simplicity of this model, investor 5 (and others of its class) prefers to purchase 
assets at depressed prices in order to achieve higher returns.  By purchasing 
assets from at-risk institutions, the special investor shores up a potential liquidity 
crisis and hopes to eventually profit from the asset purchase.  Though this seems 
logical and beneficial, it also distorts the soundness of the chain. 
Because institutions C and D sold their assets after the initial shock, they 
were forced to sell a fraction d of their assets such that dZ(P) = fC, where f is the 
proportion of the cash obligation C that must be paid (i.e. a margin call) so that   
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0 ≤ f ≤ 1.  Thus, ; d cannot be greater than 1, or the bank would be 
insolvent and cease operation.  The institution’s payoff from selling at time zero 
(with probability q that their sale pays off the cash obligation) is:
, which simplifies to  after 
substituting for d110.  Thus, the institutions have paid a premium, or “illiquidity 
cost,” of  by selling for P<1, as is often the case when margin calls grow 
in the face of a crisis.   
The asset sale triggers a range of troubling implications.  Because two of 
the institutions engaged in a large-scale asset sell-off, they are more at-risk than 
the remaining institutions that were not forced into selling because they no 
longer have the option to sell assets in light of a liquidity shock.  This also means 
that the entire chain is more vulnerable because it contains firms that have 
previously suffered from liquidity shocks.  Moreover, a massive asset sale of this 
scale combined with liquidity concerns would also trigger further price 
depression.  This realization also has stark implications for the rest of the 
institutions in the chain because if they choose to engage in an asset sale, they 
will have to sell off a higher fraction of their total assets to meet cash obligations 
than did the first two firms.  It is clear that this asset sale will have inherently 
increased the instability of the chain and the entities within it. 
                                                
110 Douglas W. Diamond and Raghuram G. Rajan (2009): “Fear of Fire Sales and the Credit Freeze,” a National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper (14925). 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Let Figure 3 (above) depict T = -1 so that the chain model we are 
examining has already weathered a liquidity shock and two of its institutions 
have sold off assets so as to remain operable.  At T = 0, these institutions have 
attracted new financing from a “normal” investor and the chain has been 
repaired.  However, they are also limited in their ability to recover from another 
liquidity shock—their new, diminished asset base (Z’) is smaller than the amount 
of cash needed to meet payment obligations.111  Thus the chain is more 
susceptible ceteris paribus having already weathered a liquidity shock.     
 
Figure 9: An Unstable Chain 
 
Timeline: 
 
T = -1  T = 0 
Shock hits 
investor 3 
C and D sell 
assets to raise 
cash 
Chain 
repaired, but 
unstable 
 
Institution Types 
 
Though institutions and investors are identical prior to any shocks, they 
become heterogeneous after shocks hit the chain.  In this case, as a function of 
their position in the chain, institutions have different expected utilities.   
                                                
111 In this case, as with both LTCM and Bear Stearns, it would be extremely prudent to raise cash by another means—an equity offering or other external investment, regardless of any premium paid due to market depressions or liquidity fears. 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Figure 10 
 
Institution F in the figure above is an endpoint institution that is “at-risk.”  It will 
fail during the next period due to a lack of funding unless management opts to 
sell assets and increase liquidity.  Institution F’s expected utility is: 𝐸 𝑈 ! =𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ] where b is the probability that the firm 
defaults and its converse, 1 – b, is the probability that the firm sells assets to 
increase liquidity.  Here v is the bankruptcy return on assets Z, (1 - d)Z represents 
the asset base not sold to raise cash, and 1+ 𝛽 ! is the utility return gained by 
surviving n periods.  
 Institution C is a borderline institution.  This institution is not 
immediately at risk, but faces the withdrawal of an investor in the following 
period.  These institutions have a normalized current expected utility of 𝐸 𝑈 !!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 !], given that it will not be forced to sell assets this time 
period.  Next period, C will become “at-risk” institutions and face the expected 
utility of an endpoint institution: 𝐸 𝑈 !!!! = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! − 𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ].  This probable future instability must be accounted for in current 
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expected utility.  The term 
!! (where 𝜋 stands for the term 1− 𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍  will allow for the expected future position of the institution.  Thus, 
firm C’s current expected utility as depicted in Figure 4 will be 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! =𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! + !!].  
Finally, institution A (and B) in the diagram represents interior (or 
shielded) institutions.  They will not face significant risks for two—or more—
periods.  Thus, these institutions’ utility equations are similar to those of 
borderline investors, with a small tweak.  The term 
!! must be altered to consider 
the relative length of time that an interior firm will spend being stable with 
reliable sources of financing.  To account for this stability, the term 𝜋 is squared because the contagion is  more than  two periods off,with exponentially
less risk involved.  This results in the utility function for an interior (safe) 
institution as follows 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! + ! ! !]. 
 
Scenario 1—No Interaction 
 Assume another shock hits the chain at T = 0.  In this simple chain, with 4 
institutions and 4 investors, the probability of an iid shock hitting one of the 
susceptible institutions is .25.  If a shock were to hit one of the less-stable 
institutions or one of their sources of financing, they would be unable to engage 
in an asset sale to stave off insolvency. Let us project a shock that hits investor 2 
at T = 0 so that institutions B and C would both lose a source of financing.  Firm 
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C, having already weathered a liquidity shock and sold off a large portion of its 
assets, will become insolvent due to a lack of financing and excessive leverage.  
Because C will default on its payment obligations to investor 3, investor 3 will 
withdraw financing from institution D at T = 1 (in order to reallocate from an 
undiversified risky portfolio to one comprised of safer assets).  Institution D will 
suffer the same fate as institution C (it had already suffered an asset sell off as 
well) at T = 1.   
Let us assume that the asset market in this model has an enlarged bid-ask 
spread, such that the “ask” price sellers demand is much higher than potential 
buyers’ “bid” prices.  This is a direct consequence of the fire sale that occurred 
when Institutions C and D rapidly sold off large amounts of their assets.  
Institution B, having lost one of its two fundamental sources of financing 
(investor 2) in another shock, must engage in a massive sell off of its assets in 
order to meet payment obligations to investor 1.  Unfortunately, B must sell at a 
further depressed price P1, such that P1 < P0 < 1, where 1 is the return on the asset 
if held to maturity.  While C and D sold their assets for d0Z(P0) = fC  or 
where C was their payment obligation and f was the proportion of the obligation 
due, B must sell for d1Z(P1) = fC or  , where d1 > do.  While C and D paid 
an illiquidity cost of , B will pay .  Thus, B must sell a larger 
proportion of its assets to meet its liquidity demand due to depressed asset 
! 
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prices.  Despite institution B’s financial health prior to the second shock, the fire 
sale that began with institutions C and D has threatened both its liquidity and 
solvency.   
Timeline: 
 
T = -1  T = 0  T = 1 
Shock hits 
investor 3 
C and D sell 
assets to raise 
cash 
Chain 
repaired, but 
unstable 
C defaults, 
investor 5 
withdraws 
Investor 4 
withdraws 
  
Second shock 
hits investor 2 
D defaults, 
B sells 
assets 
 
 T = 2  T = 3  
A defaults 
(asset market 
illiquid) 
Investor 1 
withdraws B defaults Total chain 
collapse 
 
 
Depending on the size of the chain and the extent of the fire sale of assets 
that has occurred prior to this point, it is possible that the asset prices have 
decreased enough so that selling is no longer a viable option for a troubled 
institution.  Due to extreme leverage, it is likely that their payment obligations 
vastly exceed the amount of cash they could expect to earn by selling assets. This 
scenario could occur near the end of an extended liquidity crisis.  Surviving 
institutions and their investors may face the specter of insolvency without the 
choice of whether or not to sell assets.  
Institution A has the option to engage in a preemptive asset sale.  With 
foresight, institution A could sell assets at the same time as institution B (at T = 1) 
in response to the shock.  Institution A would face price P1 for a sale at T=1 
(remember: P1 < P0 < 1, where 1 is the return guaranteed by holding assets to 
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maturity) and pay illiquidity cost .  However, because A did not lose a 
lender prior to selling assets, it also pays the opportunity cost of holding cash 
instead of return-generating assets: R(dZ) = 0, where dZ is the proportion of 
assets sold.  Thus, A would sacrifice the return on dZ of its assets by selling 
preemptively.  Though a sell off would protect A from single lender failure, it 
would not prevent default if both of A’s lenders collapse, which is a distinct 
possibility.  It also diminishes the firm’s short-term profitability (the firm would 
sell a portion of its return-generating assets at depressed prices and thus hold 
excess cash reserves for an unspecified period).  Under the established 
preferences, management will maintain a microprudential strategy and abstain 
from an asset sell-off to protect against what may be an impaired financing 
chain112.  
In this chain, which explores the effects of a fire sale, expected utilities 
vary wildly between institutions.  Firms C and D, who already sold a portion of 
their assets to raise liquidity, have an expected liquidity of 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! = 𝑈[ 1−𝑞 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑞 𝑣𝑍 ], where q is the probability of a shock hitting the 
institution (or one of its investors) at the next date.   This measure is extremely 
similar to that of an “endpoint” investor, though these institutions have already 
sold off a portion of their assets and will default apropos of a funding withdrawal.  
Institutions A and B, however, have expected utility functions 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! =
                                                
112 The transient nature of management roles and executive compensation structures at Wall Street institutions dramatically emphasizes short‐run profitability over long‐run viability.  
fC( 1P1
!1)
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𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! + !!], where q represents the probability that a shock will strike the 
chain next period (and thus A or B—or both—will become endpoint investors).   
The “fire sale externality”—where “each individual institution takes 
potential fire sale prices as given, while as a group they cause [depressed] 
prices”113—that exists in this model leads to Pareto inefficiency and market 
failure.  This doomsday scenario will not occur if institutions develop an avenue 
for communication and cooperation.  If institutions A and B communicate, they 
can jointly appeal for influxes of investment and stabilize their financing 
situation.  Theoretically, this solution can occur at any point in the chain as long 
as some medium of firm-to-firm interaction exists.  
 
    Figure 6 
 
 
The most effective and logical avenue for inter-firm cooperation is the 
government (specifically the Treasury Department and Fed).  Public finance 
theory stipulates that a government should correct for market failures and 
scenarios such as this—when financial stability is tenuous—are no exception. 
 
Scenario 2—Government incentive 
Let us assume that the government plays a role in mitigating the liquidity 
                                                
113 Tobias Adrian and Markus K. Brunnermeier (2010): “CoVar,” a Federal Reserve Bank of New York working paper. 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crisis.  This altered scenario will also begin at T = o following a liquidity shock at 
T = -1, which prompted institutions C and D to sell assets (recall Figure 4) at T = 
0 to meet payment obligations: 
 
Institutions A and B in this scenario now have the option and incentive to sell 
assets in advance of a liquidity shock (with knowledge that one already occurred). 
A and B will sell assets after T = 0 prompted by C and D’s sale after a shock at T = 
-1.  In this scenario, the government will guarantee A and B asset prices higher 
than the fire sale price they would expect to receive in an illiquid market.  Having 
raised cash provisionally, these two institutions will be prepared for a liquidity 
shock at T = 1, which may or may not occur.  C and D sold of their assets 
and A and B will sell .  At T = -1, C and D paid an illiquidity cost of 
.  Government intervention in the asset market will allow A and B to  
sell for asset price P’1 such that P0 ≤ P’1 < 1.  Thus, institutions A and B pay a 
liquidity cost of , which is a premium over the market price P1 and an 
incentive to sell assets as a precaution114.  This injection of cash into the financial 
                                                
114 Price P’1 must be greater than or equal to the expected return on assets forgone. XX 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sector can be likened to the TARP115 facility employed by the Bush administration 
in 2008—wherein the Treasury paid a premium to take “troubled assets” off of 
institutional balance sheets—except that the asset sale occurs prior to a second 
shock.     
This intervention provides institutions A and B with enough cash on hand 
to pay off cash obligations that arise due to a liquidity shock at T = 1.  
Unfortunately, it does nothing to shore up the troubled balance sheets of 
institutions C and D.  Shocks to either institution or any of their investors—2, 4, 
and 5—will result in massive defaults across the board (as in scenario 1) and 
culminate in Figure 6: 
 
    Figure 6 
 
Timeline: 
T = -1  T = 0  T = 1 
Shock hits 
investor 3 
C and D sell 
assets to raise 
cash 
Chain 
repaired, but 
unstable 
A and B sell 
assets 
preemptively 
Shock hits 
either 
damaged 
institution 
 T = 2 
C and D 
default; 
investor 5 fails 
A and B 
acquire new 
financing 
Investors 2 
and 4 
withdraw 
Investor 6 
enters chain 
                                                
115 The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) stipulated the government purchase of assets and equity from many notable financial institutions so as to stabilize the financial sector in light of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2008. 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 This government intervention significantly alters the measure of expected 
utility for certain firms in the chain.  C and D, previously stricken by liquidity 
shocks, have the same expected utility functions at T = 0 as in the fire sale 
externality scenario116.  However, institutions A and B realize different expected 
utility functions given the government incentive to sell assets prior to a shock.  
The expected utility function for institution A (and B) is as follows: 𝐸 𝑈 !!!! =𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 𝑥𝑍 − 1− 𝑥 1− 𝑑 𝑍 + 𝑔𝑑𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ], where x is the 
probability that A sells assets prior to a liquidity shock and gdZ, which is the 
benefit received (g, above market price) for assets sold (dZ) preemptively.  If Z < 1− 𝑑 𝑍 + 𝑔𝑑𝑍, the institution will sell preemptively.  Otherwise, it will accept 
the risk of a shock because it realizes more utility in the current period by 
maintaining its asset base. 
Though the asset sale and cash injection has insulated institutions A and B 
from the domino-like collapse of their peers, the surviving institutions may face a 
credit freeze and extremely unfavorable asset values.  A and B will have enough 
cash on hand to pay obligations and continue to operate until they can secure a 
different means of financing at period T = 3.  It is very likely that they will pay a 
high premium for term financing, if it is available at all.  The failure of two high 
profile banking institutions will have had stark implications for the financing 
market, as risk profiles of survivors will appear murky at best.  Though this 
government intervention successfully abated widespread contagion, it 
                                                
116 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! = 1 − 𝑞 1 − 𝑑 𝑍 ∙ 𝑈 1 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑈 ! −  𝑞 𝑣𝑍 ∙ 𝑈 , where the institution will fail if hit by a shock (with probability q), but maximizes the utility of (1‐d)Z assets otherwise. 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significantly depleted the industry and required the government to purchase 
depressed assets at a large premium over market price.  The results of this 
exercise demand exploration of other governmental interventions.   
 
Scenario 3—Government as conduit 
 Instead of purchasing troubled assets at high premiums to stave off 
instability, governments may “guarantee” loans for at-risk institutions.  By 
putting the weight of the government’s balance sheet behind a firm’s finances, the 
government may be able to prevent a fire sale and the widespread default 
characteristic of scenarios 1 and 2.   Once again, this scenario will begin at T = 0 
following a shock at T = -1, wherein investor 3 failed and institutions C and D lost 
a source of financing—as in Figure 7 below: 
 
The government, fearing the systemic repercussions of an idiosyncratic shock, 
will attempt to shore up institutional liquidity by stepping in to extend and 
guarantee funding.  Instead of engaging in an asset sale, troubled institutions 
(such as C and D) receive lines of credit from the government and post their 
assets as collateral.   In this case, the government replaced investor 3 as a source 
of financing for institutions C and D.  Moreover, the government will guarantee 
the troubled institutions’ loans to investors 2 and 4.  This strategy prevents 
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extreme downward pressure on already depressed asset prices by precluding an 
asset sell off. 
 
Figure 7 
 
The introduction of government as lender dramatically transforms the 
nature of the chain.  Because the government is interminably secure, the other 
investors in the chain will benefit from improved confidence and the knowledge 
that the probability of a collapse has decreased significantly.  At the same time, 
the market or financial sector as a whole may stigmatize those in receipt of 
government support, considering it a sign of weakness.  In reality, this is a logical 
assumption founded on substantial evidence.  However, in this model, by 
guaranteeing “at-risk” loans, the government implicitly secures investors 2 and 4 
from the danger that C or D suffers a shock.  The so-called “stigma” of 
government investment will not be addressed in this model.  In the eyes of their 
peers, the “at-risk” institutions (under the auspices of government intervention) 
have reclaimed the characteristics of a non-troubled institution.  It must be noted 
that the government will not bankroll these institutions “forever.”  It is a 
suboptimal strategy for the government to “nationalize” banking institutions for a 
multiplicity of reasons.  For the effects of the intervention to have its full effect; 
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however, the government must not disclose its financing timeframe.  This 
intervention strategy alleviates the downward pressure on prices characteristic of 
a fire sale and prevents contagious collapse.  
Institutional expected utilities change significantly when the government 
introduces this intervention.  By guaranteeing funding to troubled institutions, 
the government attempts to prevent a liquidity crisis from threatening the 
financial sector’s stability.  “At risk” institutions C and D have expected utility 𝐸(𝑈)!!!! = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 ∙ 𝑍 ∙ 1+ !! ! − 𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ], where 1+ !! !is the survival utility 
return given government financing (𝜎 deflates the survival multiplier because a 
portion of future earnings must be used to repay the government).  
 
Scenario 4—Industry-led Bailout 
The government may also choose to play a less obvious role in mitigating 
systemic contagion.  As it did in 1998 in response to the LTCM collapse, the 
government could informally organize an industry-led bailout of “at-risk” firms.  
That is, the Treasury and Fed could employ their substantial authority to induce 
some sort of agreement among healthier institutions to guarantee the survival of 
an “at-risk” institution.  This follows from the scenario 1 assertion that it may be 
in healthier firms’ best interest to rescue a troubled firm.  Without an effective 
means of communication, firm preferences dictate that an industry-led bailout 
would never occur.  However, if the Fed or Treasury can assemble management 
teams from concerned parties, the government may be able to spur a concerted 
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effort to expand liquidity and protect the industry from systemic risk spillover.  
Will firms pledge a portion mZ of their assets to guarantee that an “at-risk” 
institution does not fail and collapse a susceptible chain? 
Let us once again assume that a shock hit investor 3 at T = -1 and spurred 
a liquidity crisis for institutions C and D (as in Figure 7).  Institutions C and D 
will now be considered “at risk” endpoint institutions, with expected utility 
functions 𝐸(𝑈!"#$%)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ]. 
 
Figure 7 
 
The government, in order to prompt a private “rescue”—or sale, must convince 
the other firms that they will gain utility by helping “at risk” institutions.  Though 
institutions A and B have a vested interest in the continued survival of the 
financing chain, there is a free rider problem.  Each firm would prefer not to 
engage in a private bailout, but would prefer to benefit from a private bailout 
spearheaded by its competitor.  The government, in its stabilizing role, must 
convince both institutions that a two-party private rescue is mutually beneficial 
for both of them.  Thus, the Fed and Treasury would insist that A and B’s 
expected utility functions are not 𝐸(𝑈!"#$%!!)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! − !!], but 
actually 𝐸(𝑈!"#$%!!)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! − 𝑞(!! |!"#$%& , (𝑀 − !!!!!)|!"#$%&#'] where M 
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is a measure of the potential benefit gained by a rescue and 
!!!!!  is a measure of 
the potential cost spread over participatory institutions.  Healthy firms will 
participate in the bailout as long as 𝑀 > !!!!!.  If 𝑀 < !!!!!, the government will 
provide “savior” firms an additional incentive until the potential benefits 
outweigh the potential costs.  
 
Figure 8 
 
It must be noted that this sale may also occur at the behest of an 
institution not included in the financing chain.  In this case, the troubled firm in 
question will be removed from the chain upon acquisition.  Though this solution 
is optimal to default, it leaves two investors with suboptimal portfolio allocations 
unless the troubled institution’s loans are guaranteed either by its acquirer or 
another party.  In this case, the potential “savior” firm will have an expected 
utility function 𝐸(𝑈!"#$%&!)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! − 𝑞(𝜇|!"#$%& , (𝑀 − 𝜃)|!"#$%&#'], 
where 𝜇 is the potential harm from an institutional default and 𝑀 − 𝜃 is the 
benefit of the acquisition less its cost.   
If another shock hits the chain at T = 0, all firms in the chain will be able 
to engage in an asset sell off at less-depressed market prices than if C and D had 
been forced to sell assets prior to the second shock.  Moreover, as a result of the 
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industry-led bailout, C and D will not fail after a second shock hits the chain.  
This is the optimal strategy for the government, in that it does not have to put its 
own balance sheet at risk by purchasing assets or guaranteeing loans for troubled 
institutions.  Instead, other financial institutions will “foot the bill” so to speak 
because otherwise they would face a liquidity shortage and fire sale.  Obviously, 
the financial sector would prefer scenario 3 (direct government bailout), but at 
the government’s prerogative, it should elect to induce an industry-led bailout.  
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2.2 
 
T H E   S U B P R I M E   C R I S I S 
___ 
 
 
This examination of the 2008 crisis will employ the modified Lagunoff-
Schreft model previously expounded to evaluate the government’s attempt to 
prevent a systemic collapse.  I will explore the chain of events that occurred 
following the collapse of Bear Stearns by evaluating the effects of the 
government’s decisions.   
Table 1—Institutions (as of January 2008) 
Bank Holding  
Companies 
Ticker 
Symbol 
  
Bank of America Corporation BAC 
Citigroup C 
JPMorgan Chase and Company JPM 
Wachovia WB 
Wells Fargo and Company WFC 
  
Investment  
Banks 
Ticker 
Symbol 
  
Bear Stearns Companies BSC 
Goldman Sachs Group GS 
Lehman Brothers Holdings LEH 
Merrill Lynch and Company MER 
Morgan Stanley MS 
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Figure 9: US Broker-Dealers117 
 
When the federal government rescued Bear Stearns in March 2008, it 
guaranteed a secured line of financing while JPMorgan finalized its acquisition.  
Interestingly, Steve Black, co-head of Morgan’s investment bank, was quoted a 
month prior to the Bear deal as saying that a Morgan investment banking 
acquisition would have to occur “over his dead body.”118  By exerting their 
tremendous influence and appealing to Jamie Dimon’s sense of history, Hank 
Paulson and Tim Geithner deftly arranged for JPMorgan to takeover Bear, but 
sweetened the deal with guaranteed term financing to keep the firm afloat during 
the takeover period.  Thus, the Fed’s organized sale of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan 
corresponds to Scenario 4 of the modified Lagunoff-Schreft model.  The 
government organized a private bailout of a troubled firm (one that had suffered 
a shock—in this case, a severe liquidity shock), but needed to employ its own 
balance sheet as an incentive to ensure a viable deal.  
                                                
117 A combination of leverage ratios and shareholder’s equity are the logical basis for the organization of this chain: in late 2007, Bear Stearns operated with a leverage ratio of 34:1 and a market  
118 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street. 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In the period leading up to the deal, Bear Stearns faced a massive cash 
crunch and run on its accounts.   Bear Stearns had an expected utility function 
similar to that of an “at risk” institution, where 𝐸(𝑈!"#)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 1−𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ].  At T = -1, Bear’s only options are: bankruptcy, denoted 
by the term b(vZ) and an asset sale, denoted by 1− 𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 !.  As its 
capital reserves decreased and stock price plummeted, the probability of a failure 
and bankruptcy (b) began to increase dramatically, until the government—and 
JPMorgan—stepped in to ensure the firm’s survival. 
Between T = -1 and 0 (the date of the rescue), the Fed convinced Morgan 
leadership that the potential damage of a Bear default would vastly outweigh the 
costs of the costs of acquiring the troubled investment bank.  Moreover, the 
Treasury offered the support of its balance sheet as an incentive and stabilizing 
measure.  JPMorgan’s utility function at the time of the sale (T = 0) would have 
changed from that of an insulated firm at T = -1—𝐸(𝑈!"#)!!!!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −!!]).  At T = 0, JPMorgan’s utility function becomes 𝐸(𝑈!"#$%&')!!!!!!! = 𝑈[𝑍 1+𝛽 ! − 𝑞(𝜇|!"#$%& , (𝑀 − 𝜃)|!"#$%&#'].  At this point, it is important to note that 
JPMorgan is not an institution in the broker-dealer chain due to its deposit-
taking, banking conglomerate status.  By acquiring Bear Stearns, JPMorgan 
effectively removed them from the broker-dealer chain, while the government 
guaranteed their loans for a limited period.  Thus, at T = 0,  
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Figure 10: Post-Bear acquisition (T=0) 
  are  
The bailout exacerbated the credit crunch to such an extent that the Fed opened 
its discount window to the remaining investment banks in an effort to restore 
liquidity to the system. Thus, the Fed set two unlikely precedents in March: the 
Bear rescue and the “blurred distinction” between commercial and investment 
banks.119    
Bear Stearns’ absence altered the landscape of investment banking 
significantly.  Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch became the most vulnerable 
links in the Wall Street chain.  Both firms engaged in a concerted effort to trim 
assets and increase liquidity.  The investment banks are in an open chain 
following Bear Stearns’ collapse and sale to JPMorgan Between T = 0 and T = 1, 
investors 4 and 5 will withdraw from the financing chain and reallocate their 
undiversified portfolios entirely into the safe asset.  By virtue of their asset sale, 
Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch can attract a new investor to provide term 
                                                
119 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street.  Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner’s rationale was that every advanced banking firm (depository or not) was linked due to the widespread use of derivatives. 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financing (as in Figure 11 below).   
 
Figure 12 
 
Having sold off a portion of assets to increase capital reserves and secure 
financing, Lehman and Merrill find themselves highly susceptible to a downturn 
in the credit markets.  Their utility functions should resemble that of the “at-risk” 
institutions articulated in the model, such that 𝐸(𝑈!"#,!"#)!!!!!! = 𝑈[ 1−𝑏 1− 𝑑 𝑍 1+ 𝛽 ! −  𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ].  However, the precedent set when the Fed bailed 
out Bear Stearns systematically alters the preferences and utility functions of 
these at-risk institutions.  Given the Bear Stearns precedent, wherein the Fed 
supported a troubled investment institution with the full weight of its balance 
sheet, Lehman and Merrill operate with the reasonable expectation that they too 
could expect some sort of government intervention in the face of collapse.  Thus, 
the two ailing investment banks would have utility functions at T = 1 of 𝐸(𝑈!"#,!"#)!!!!!! = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 𝑍 1+ !! ! −  !! 𝑣𝑍 ], where !! is a measure of the 
firm’s survival, divided by the government’s stake (which must be repaid), and 
!! 
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is the probability of a shock-induced default (which has been dramatically 
reduced by a governmental rescue 𝜀).  This utility equation allows for the firms’ 
reasonable assumption that the government will have a hand in forestalling 
financial contagion.  Because the 
!! measure has significantly reduced the 
probability of failure, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch will resume operations 
“as normal” despite their tenuous positions.   They reasonably expect that the 
government will provide assistance in case of some shock in the future.   
 Unfortunately for Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, a second shock did 
occur, albeit sometime later.  For the simplicity of the model, let us assume that 
the second shock occurs at T = 3.120  In the time between T = 1 and T = 3.  The 
value of Lehman and Merrill’s capital had diminished considerably.  When it 
attempts to secure financing at T = 2, Lehman’s credit rating and asset base are 
nearly impossible to borrow against due to the declining value of its assets.  At T 
= 2, investor 6 secures lines of credit to LEH and MER (despite their lack of 
liquidity and collateral-worthy capital), but insists that it will reallocate its 
portfolio to the safe asset at T = 3, which will spawn an open chain (as in Figure 
12). 
                                                
120 In reality, the second shock occurred in September of 2008, about 5 months after the collapse of Bear Stearns in March.  On September 7th, when Hank Paulson released surprising legislation that placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac into a government conservatorship.  Though markets rallied on the 8th, credit markets tightened the following day and almost all of Lehman’s stock changed hands.  Once confidence evaporated, the firm suffered a run on its accounts, which crippled its capitalization. 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Figure 112 
 
Between T = 2 and T = 3, both firms will attempt to raise capital privately, 
which is preferable to the stigma that accompanies a government “bail out.”  
Thus, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch have utility functions: 
𝐸(𝑈!"#,!"#)!!!!!! = 𝑈! 1− 𝑏 𝑍 1+ !! ! −  !! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑈! 1− 𝑏 𝑍 1+ !!!! ! −   !!!! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒  
!!!!, the survival metric divided by the profits due to rescuer, is smaller in for a 
private deal than a government deal.  At the same time, the probability of a 
default 
!!!! is higher for a private rescue, because private firms are much more 
likely to fail than the US government.  In either case the normalized probability b 
of “at-risk” firm failure is much greater than !! or !!!!, which are the probabilities 
in Lehman and Merrill’s utility functions given the bailout precedent. 
At T = 3, Lehman is unable to reach a deal with a private investor or other 
firm.  Merrill, on the other hand, consummates a deal with Bank of America 
(BAC), a large corporate bank.  Bank of America pledges mZ assets to acquire 
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Merrill Lynch at T = 3 (Bank of America did not require or request any federal 
assistance when it acquired Merrill).  Because it operated under the assumption 
that a bailout would come either privately or publicly, Lehman failed to account 
for the real possibility of bankruptcy.  Thus, the realized probability that Lehman 
would fail b is much higher than anticipated at T = 3.  Lehman’s expected utility 
function121 at T = 2 failed to account for a scenario where the firm would not be 
rescued.  Lehman’s actual utility function at T = 2 should have incorporated the 
risk of an actual default scenario.122 
Barclays Capital, a British bank, indicated that it would have acquired 
Lehman Brothers123 had the Fed stepped in and guaranteed Lehman’s obligations 
for an interim period while Barclays’ shareholders approved the deal.  The Fed, 
however, refused to employ its balance sheet power to rescue Lehman and the 
firm went bankrupt on September 15, 2008.  Lehman defaulted on $600 billion, 
which shook credit markets to their core.  It was the largest bankruptcy in the 
history of the United States.124  
                                                
121 𝐸(𝑈!"#,!"#)!!!!!! = 𝑈! 1 − 𝑏 𝑍 1 + !! ! −  !! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒 +𝑈! 1 − 𝑏 𝑍 1 + !!!! ! −   !!!! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒  
122 Wall Street executives were surprised to learn that the government would let Lehman fail and worried about the repercussions of its bankruptcy. As Lehman tottered, Jamie Dimon, JPMorgan’s CEO, expressed a palpable concern: he warned Morgan’s risk manager that he should prepare for the failure of Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs! 
123 Barclays PLC acquired Lehman’s operations outside of the United States in fall 2008. 
124 On the 15th, the Dow plummeted 504 points, the interest rate on 30 day T‐bills dropped to a fifth of a percent, and Morgan Stanley’s stock declined 23%. 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Figure 12 
 
On September 16th, disruptions caused by Lehman’s bankruptcy forced the 
US government to bail out American International Group, who was deemed too 
systemically important to fail. The Fed effectively nationalized AIG, the leading 
originator of credit default swaps (and thus insurer of Wall Street’s CDOs and 
mortgage portfolios).  Regulators came to the determination that AIG’s 
“underlying businesses were more enduring than Lehman’s, its collateral was 
more secure, and it was a better credit risk.”125  Moreover, Paulson and other 
government officials feared that the “indirect but systemic effects of an AIG 
collapse would send a second Lehman-style tidal wave over Wall Street.”126  
Realizing that it had not accounted for the devastating fallout of Lehman’s 
failure, the Fed quickly abandoned its crusade against moral hazard and threw its 
support behind a troubled insurance giant.  Ironically, Paulson extended loans to 
the hollowed-out shell of Lehman Brothers that would allow its assets to be 
purchased by Barclays.  By Tuesday night (September 16th), Morgan Stanley faced 
                                                
125 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street. 
126 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street. 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an onslaught of hedge fund withdrawals and stark undercapitalization.  
With Lehman gone and Merrill in the hands of Ken Lewis and Bank of 
America, Wall Street was left with two wavering broker-dealers.  Paulson and 
Geithner implored that they convert themselves into bank holding companies 
and requested that both firms evaluate possible mergers with commercial banks, 
Goldman with Wachovia and Morgan Stanley with JPMorgan or Citi.  As the 
financial system quivered on the brink of destruction and credit markets froze, 
the Fed acted to circumvent systemic contagion and announced that it would 
inject a massive chunk of capital into the financial sector.  Unfortunately, 
Congress was unready and for the most part unwilling to approve a large taxpayer 
bank bailout at that time. The two remaining broker dealers secured investments 
from private sources: Morgan Stanley from Japanese bank Mitsubishi UFJ and 
Goldman from Warren Buffett.    
 
Figure 13: Goldman and Morgan Stanley 
 
 
In terms of the model, at T = 4 the government has stepped in to provide funding 
for the broker-dealers and they have acquired new financing from private 
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sources.  Both firms have satisfied their T = 4 expected utility functions, with 
both private and public financing. 
𝐸(𝑈!",!")!!!!!! = 𝑈! 1− 𝑏 𝑍 1+ !! ! −  !! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒 +𝑈! 1− 𝑏 𝑍 1+ !!!! ! −   !!!! 𝑣𝑍 |𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑣   
 
With TARP up for debate on Capitol Hill, Washington Mutual suffered a 
bank run and went bankrupt on Thursday, September 25th.  The government 
seized the troubled retail bank and sold it to JPMorgan, but neither Morgan nor 
the government repaid WaMu’s debt.  The final tally of bailouts and non-bailouts 
was extremely complicated.  The government guaranteed Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac’s obligations, Lehman had defaulted on its debt, AIG had been 
supported by the government, and now Washington Mutual debt holders had 
been thrown to the wolves.  At the same time, Wachovia began to suffer a run on 
its accounts and considered offers from both Citigroup and Wells Fargo.  
Wachovia balked at Citi’s offer, Wells acquired Wachovia, and Citigroup’s stock 
began to plummet.  On October 2nd, the Dow fell 350 points under the stress of 
Citi’s instability and undercapitalization.  Fearing a systemic collapse and the 
wrath of the American people, the Senate and House approved the TARP.  Asset 
prices, especially mortgage securities, continued their slide. 
The first two weeks of October wreaked havoc on financial markets across the 
globe.  The financial system suffered from a massive shortage of capital.      
The first two weeks of October wreaked havoc on financial markets across 
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the globe.  The system suffered from a massive shortage of capital.  On the 9th, the 
market crashed again—by a mind-numbing 679 points.  Investors flocked to 
“safe” treasuries and sent financial stocks plummeting.  The rate for 30-day T-
bills “plunged to a microscopic five one-hundredths of a point.”127  The fickle 
market brought Morgan Stanley to its knees—its shares hovered around $10, a 
twelve year low.  Prompted by European debt guarantees on Sunday morning 
(the 13th), Paulson abandoned his crusade against moral hazard and convened a 
financial roundtable at the Treasury Department.   
Along with Sheila Bair, Ben Bernanke, and Tim Geithner, Paulson insisted 
that a recovery package guarantee bank debts so as to mirror the European 
proscription.  Without a guarantee, they could not be sure that lenders would 
accept banks as counterparties.  The guarantee effectively meant that bank 
holding companies and savings-and-loans to refinance outstanding debt with 
new, federally guaranteed debt with a three-year term.  This move allowed banks 
to “raise money at a much lower cost, as lenders would not have to worry about 
default risk.”128  The likes of Bank of America, BNY Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman 
Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, State Street, and Wells 
Fargo were represented at the Treasury (the nine largest financial institutions in 
the country).  Paulson alerted the CEOs of his plan and pledged $250 billion to 
the US banking industry, with $125 billion allocated to the nine biggest firms.129  
                                                
127 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street. 
128 Lowenstein (2010): The End of Wall Street. 
129 Citi received an additional $20 billion in TARP funds on November 24th.  Its market capitalization in November fell to about $6 billion (down from a historical high of $244 billion).  The government 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The financial system was finally afloat and buoyed by an abundance of capital. 
The remaining specialized broker-dealers, Morgan Stanley and Goldman 
Sachs, became bank holding companies.  By transforming into BHCs, these firms 
received the TARP’s capital injection and lending facility.   
 
                Figure 13 
 
Thus, the broker-dealer chain modeled in this chapter effectively disappeared 
during the fall of 2008.  JPMorgan acquired Bear Stearns, Wells Fargo purchased 
Wachovia, Bank of America collected Merrill Lynch and Countrywide Financial, 
and Goldman and Morgan Stanley effectively joined the ranks of the commercial 
banks.  Wall Street, as it had previously existed (and prospered), is no longer 
recognizable. 
 
Figure 14: Present System 
                                                                                                                                            also pledged to cover 90% of its losses on a $300+ billion mortgage portfolio in exchange for substantial control and $27 billion in preferred equity. 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Table 2—US Bank Aggregation (as of January 2008) 
Bank Holding  
Companies 
Ticker Symbol 
  
Bank of America Corporation + Merrill Lynch & Co. BAC 
Citigroup C 
JPMorgan Chase and Company + Bear Stearns JPM 
Wells Fargo and Company + Wachovia WFC 
Goldman Sachs Group GS 
Lehman Brothers Holdings LEH 
Morgan Stanley MS 
 
 The government has played an inexorable role in the transformation of the 
financial services industry in 2007.  The regulatory and policymaking team of 
Bernanke-Paulson-Geithner compelled every major firm, regardless of health, to 
absorb federal funds on an astonishing scale.  Thus, in terms of this study’s 
model, the surviving primary financial institutions would all come to resemble 
that of an institution in scenario 3: 𝐸(𝑈)!"#$%&'(%()(%*& = 𝑈[ 1− 𝑏 ∙ 𝑍 ∙ 1+ !! ! −𝑏 𝑣𝑍 ], where 1+ !! ! is the “survival utility return given government financing 
(𝜎 deflates the survival multiplier because a portion of future earnings must be 
used to repay the government).”130  The government made its position clearer in 
the following weeks, when it infused $20 billion more in Citigroup.  Paulson and 
his advisors would not allow the failure of another systemically important firm on 
their watch.  Though it may have shored up the liquidity questions surrounding 
the crisis, the government policy of credit provision did not address a massive 
                                                
130 From Scenario 3—Government as Conduit. 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deficiency of high-quality capital on Wall Street and the repercussions deflated 
the global economy.     
 86 
3.1 
 
C O N C L U S I O N 
___ 
 
 
 
The late 2000s financial crisis dramatically altered financial and economic 
landscapes across the globe.  The collapse and ensuing recession depressed the 
US economy significantly; in the six month period from October 2008 to March 
2009, the United States’ GDP declined at an annualized rate of 6%.  On March 
9th, 2009, the DJIA hit 6,547—a ten year low.  During this period over 700,000 
Americans lost their jobs.  Could this economic deflation have been mitigated? 
The central motivation of this study was to explore systemic risk within the 
financial industry during the subprime crisis and in doing so evaluate 
governmental policy responses to systemic developments.  Faced with a teetering 
financial industry on the verge of dragging the global economy into ruin, the US 
government embarked on an ad hoc policy of intervention and nonintervention 
that shook the banking industry, regulatory environment, and global financial 
economy.   
The implications of my game theory fragility model are stark.  First and 
foremost, I am able to conclude that the aggrandizement of US financial services 
and banking institutions into six extremely large firms has had significant 
implications for systemic risk.  Prior to the crisis, the US financial system 
consisted of five major banking conglomerates—JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, 
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Wachovia, Wells Fargo, and Bank of America—and five dominant investment 
banking (shadow) institutions—Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, Lehman 
Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Morgan Stanley.  The forced combination of several 
of these institutions, along with government insistence that Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley reclassify themselves as bank holding companies, has blurred the 
distinction between the traditional and shadow banking sectors.   
 The implications of banking industry aggrandizement are unclear.  Though 
the successful combination of fragile firms with healthier institutions was a 
logical solution prompted by a contagious default crisis, this improvisational 
aggregation has spawned an imbalanced and unwieldy industry.  By the logic of 
my model (and following the principle of diversification), a financing chain made 
up of six institutions (though in equilibrium), is much weaker systemically than 
two separate chains each containing five institutions.  A concentration of asset 
pools and debt obligations in a smaller number of institutions may increase the 
likelihood that an adverse shock will trigger a systemic collapse.  As a factor of 
their increased size and decrease in numbers, major US financial institutions 
have become more “systemically important” than ever before.  That being said, 
the probability of a shock adversely affecting an institution (or necessitating 
capital raising) has been diminished.  These firms’ immense balance sheets and 
the diversity of their businesses could serve as insulation from an adverse shock 
to a specific line of business or asset class.  Moreover, diversified asset holdings 
may prevent the sort of fire sale price depression delineated in the model.  Thus, 
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the repercussions of an aggregated post-crisis industry are ambiguous. 
 The government’s ad hoc intervention policies and their repercussions 
demand further analysis.  The model implies that the government would have 
better served both the industry and taxpayers by either organizing a rescue or 
bailout of Lehman Brothers.  Wittingly or not, the Bear Stearns rescue signaled to 
Lehman Brothers—and other institutions—that the government would not sit idly 
by while major firms teetered on the brink of failure. With the precedent of Bear’s 
rescue in mind, Lehman’s management (and the management at other significant 
Wall Street firms) likely operated during the crisis with some expectation of 
emergency federal aid.  Even on the verge of Lehman’s bankruptcy, many Wall 
Street insiders and analysts rationally expected that it would reach an agreement 
with the government’s help.  When the firm went under, “it set off a scramble by 
corporations and individual investors to get their money out of money-market 
funds that held Lehman debt.”131  Given Bear’s rescue, the market had not 
rationalized the possibility of Lehman’s collapse.  
Lehman Brothers’ failure was not the outright cause of the crisis, nor 
would its survival have necessarily prevented the turmoil of October 2008.  
However, Lehman’s failure signaled that the government’s “intervention plan had 
not been fully thought through.”132  Government policymakers never clarified the 
ramifications of Bear’s rescue for future scenarios.  When Kendrick Wilson joined 
                                                
131 Steve Stecklow (2009): “A 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Reserve’s 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Race,” in The 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January 17, 2009. 
132 John B. Taylor (2009): “The Financial Crisis and Policy 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An Empirical 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of What Went Wrong,” a National Bureau of 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Research working paper 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Paulson in Washington as an advisor in July, he “asked an official what the 
Treasury’s plan was in case another Bear Stearns developed.  The reply came 
quickly: ‘Ken, we don’t have a fucking plan.’”133  This “lack of a predictable 
framework for intervention,”134 to borrow John B. Taylor’s terminology, 
introduced unnecessary and harmful unpredictability into decision-making 
processes for both high-level bank management and institutional investors.  
Introduction of the TARP facility, which lacked operational oversight and 
guidelines for use, only contributed to the abounding lack of clarity. 
 Government interventions and non-interventions “caused, prolonged, and 
worsened” the ill effects of the crisis.135  The fly-by-wire nature of Bernanke, 
Paulson, and Geithner’s policymaking undermined the market’s rational 
expectations at nearly every turn.  Some observers have argued that today’s 
“largest financial institutions are ‘a random collection of survivors.’”136  What was 
the rationale for organizing the sale of Bear Stearns and letting Lehman Brothers 
fail?  After the Lehman collapse, when it seemed that the government would not 
support faltering financial concerns, Paulson bailed out AIG and Citigroup and 
forced nearly every significant institution to accept billions in TARP money.  
Though the logic behind the government’s “mythical experiment of dropping cash 
                                                
133 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134 Taylor (2009): 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135 Taylor (2009): 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136 James 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from a helicopter in the sky”137 is in itself dubious, Bernanke amplified the 
policy’s ambiguity by upholding its discretionary property.  These officials never 
announced, clarified, or framed government policy; instead, they reacted 
individually to looming systemic issues with little regard for the confusing and 
irrational policy program they had unwittingly created.  
 Within the Hendricks framework, the government mishandled its role in 
mitigating systemic risk during the crisis.  By refusing to aid Lehman Brothers, 
the government effectively established an unstable industry equilibrium.138  Due 
to the existence of self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms, the situation grew 
worse and eventually necessitated a bailout of AIG (and weeks later Citigroup). 
Government mismanagement also aggravated Hendricks’ systemic 
characteristics—contagion, hoarding, and flight—by intensifying a liquidity crisis, 
prompting a credit squeeze, and provoking a flight to safety (in treasury bonds).  
Furthermore, the crisis also witnessed a bank run, market failure, and pseudo-
infrastructure collapse.  As sentiment about bank solvency worsened, 
institutional investors closed accounts, terminated positions, and withdrew vast 
amounts of money from tainted firms.  Due to lax regulation and perverse 
incentives, credit ratings agencies failed to properly evaluate the creditworthiness 
of mortgage securities.  Finally, though no infrastructure failure occurred per se, 
a lending freeze during the crisis effectively suspended credit provision.  Within 
the context of the Hendricks formulation, the government’s errors promoted both 
                                                
137 Lowenstein (2010): 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138 It is possible that Lehman’s management 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government assistance. 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rational and irrational systemic instability.   
 Specific government policies also contributed to the environment that 
enabled the mortgage bubble and ensuing crisis.  During the 2000s, under the 
leadership of Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, the Fed maintained excessively 
low interest rates, which stimulated a housing boom.  This policy deviated from 
historical precedent and the Taylor Rule139, as described by John B. Taylor in his 
article “The Financial Crisis and Policy Responses: An Empirical Analysis of 
What Went Wrong.”  Furthermore, government policies during this period 
championed home ownership—and surreptitiously contributed to risky loan 
underwriting practices.  GSE expansion and lax mortgage regulations magnified 
the subprime problem and turbocharged the financial industry’s securitization 
machine.  This damning pattern of misguided government fiscal and monetary 
programs precluded—but undoubtedly shed light on—policy errors that occurred 
during the mortgage meltdown.  
 
Dodd-Frank and the Upshot 
Riding the coattails of a sweeping electoral victory, a newly minted 
Democratic Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act as a part of President Obama’s financial reform platform.  
According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, this 
legislation “creates a sound economic foundation to grow jobs, protect 
                                                
139 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historical 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consumers, rein in Wall Street and big bonuses, end bailouts and ‘Too Big to Fail,’ 
and prevent another financial crisis.”140  Though the bill’s specifications sated the 
public’s moral revulsion against Wall Street ‘excess,’ their vagueness blunted its 
regulatory power.  The overtly political discourse surrounding the act and 
calculated ambiguity of the bill’s provisions fail to address several of the crisis’ 
most salient consequences. 
Though ambitious in scope, Dodd-Frank has introduced unnecessary 
layers of complexity in the financial system.  It claims to end the concept of ‘Too 
Big to Fail,’ but stipulates that the government may still provide emergency loans 
to teetering firms, provided that similar borrowing terms are offered to other 
institutions. Under the act, the FDIC may also employ its ‘orderly liquidation’ 
provision to seize control of ‘systemically important’ firms, without shareholder 
or management consent.  The bill does not delineate any systematic description 
of creditor hierarchy or asset distribution for this liquidation process, which may 
drive “creditors and trading counterparties [to] flee even faster than they would 
from a firm headed toward bankruptcy.”141  Moreover, the bill does not provide 
guidelines for the determination of ‘systemically important’ firms eligible for 
federal funds.  This undermines its stability goal and reintroduces the 
“atmosphere of unpredictability”142 that characterized September and October 
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2008.  The ambiguity of Dodd-Frank financial reform has increased uncertainty 
and added new wrinkles to the conception of systemic risk. 
The legislation’s incredibly convoluted and highly ambiguous language 
illustrates the government’s inability to pragmatically and nonpolitically address 
financial reform.  The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs’ explanation of its plan to reform the Fed’s lending practices reveals this 
obscurity: 
“[This legislation] limits the Federal Reserve’s emergency lending 
authority by prohibiting emergency lending to an individual entity. 
Secretary of the Treasury must approve any lending program, programs 
must be broad based, and loans cannot be made to insolvent firms. 
Collateral must be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses.”143 
 
This stipulation does not effectively limit the Fed’s lending authority; by 
expanding the scope of any future intervention, it upholds the ‘forced-loan’ 
precedent established by TARP.  Though ‘broad based’ lending, as proposed here, 
diversifies taxpayer risk, it encourages massive balance sheet liabilities on the 
government’s behalf and precludes careful risk calculation.  In addition, one 
would never expect the Fed to inject cash into an insolvent (read: failed) 
institution, it would most likely provide financing to an institution facing the 
prospect of illiquidity, which often precedes insolvency.  Finally, this statement 
runs counter to the FDIC’s newly minted seizure capability and mandate to 
orderly liquidate failing institutions.    
 It is my recommendation that the government would be better served by 
                                                
143 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implementing several specific regulations.  First, the Treasury, Federal Reserve, 
FDIC, and SEC must cooperate to impose a two-pronged standard of strict capital 
requirements and financial statement transparency, including mark-to-market 
derivatives positions and disclosure of subsidiary holdings, on the financial 
sector.  This policy would mandate appropriate degrees of leverage industry-wide 
and facilitate counterparty risk evaluation.  Furthermore, the government must 
construct an “exceptional access framework”144 to create a predictable, 
nonpartisan process for future interventions.  This must include a constantly 
updated risk evaluation of ‘systemically important’ institutions that is available to 
the public.  I suggest a modified combination of the Dodd-Frank Act’s Financial 
Stability Oversight Council and Office of Financial Research to oversee the 
industry and assemble regular risk evaluation reports.  During a crisis, this 
oversight bureau must clearly state a diagnosis of problems and its rationale for 
interventions.145  These relatively straightforward measures, combined with 
provisions for consumer and investor protection, mortgage and lending reform, 
and increased derivatives oversight, could theoretically mitigate systemic risk in 
the financial system in the future.    
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